LIST OF SPECIAL INSPECTIONS

EXPEDITOR

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5 dated 23 Jan 69)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LATEST DATE	EO NO	TITLE
	05-45B-5/1 to /5	(Rescinded)
	/6	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/67)
	/7 to /9	(Rescinded)
	/10	(Rescinded) Inspection for Loose Debris in Bottom of Fuselage
	/11	(Rescinded)
	/12	(Rescinded) Removal of Control Lock Di
	/13	(Rescinded) Fouling of Aileron Cables
	/14	(Rescinded)
	/15	(Rescinded) Inspection for Loose Mass Balance in Rudder Horn
	/16	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/73)
	/17	(Rescinded) Chafing of De-Icer Line Against Flap Travel Limit Switch
	/18	(Rescinded) Chafing the Hose Clamps on Fuel Tank Covers
	/19 to /21	(Rescinded)
	/22	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5A/3)
	/23	(Rescinded)
	/24	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-6B/1)
	/25 to /28	(Rescinded)
	/29	(Rescinded) Inspection of Oil Tanks for Corrosion

LATEST DATE	EO NUMBER	TITLE
	05-45B-5/30 to /31	(Rescinded)
	/32	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-6A/192)
	/33.	(Rescinded)
	/34	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-6B/1)
	/35	(Rescinded)
	/36	(Rescinded) Inspection of Fuel Lines for Chafing and Leaks
	/37	(Rescinded) Binding of Tail Shock Strut
	/38	(Rescinded) Chafing of Carburettor Air Duct
	/39 to /43	(Rescinded) .
17 Dec 53	/44	Enlarged Elevator Trim Tab Shaft Taper Pin Holes
	/45 to /51	(Rescinded)
	/52	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/53)
	/53	(Rescinded)
30 Nov 54	/54	Jamming of Carburettor Air Scoop
	/55	(Rescinded) Landing Gear Drag Leg Housing for Cracks
	/56	(Rescinded)
	/57	(Rescinded) Safety Wiring of Wheel Bearing Cap Nuts
8 Dec 54	/58	VHF-ILS Interference
	/59	(Rescinded)
14 Jul 55	/60	Wing Flap Shaft Taper Pin Holes for Elongation
	/61	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/64)
	/62 to /64	(Rescinded)
8 Mar 56	/65	Carburettor Air Intake Ducting for Loose Hardware

LATEST DATE	EO NUMBER	TITLE
6 Feb 56	05-45B-5/66	Oil Dilution Placard Removal
	/67	(Rescinded) Locking of Landing Gear Clutch Cable Stop
	/68	(Rescinded) Propeller Control Adjusting Bol
	/69	(Rescinded) Deterioration of Flap Rib Stitching
	/70	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/85)
	/71	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/77)
	/72	(Rescinded)
5 Feb 57	/73	Chafing of Oil Dilution Fuel Line
	/74	(Rescinded) Elevator Control Arm for Cracking
	/75	(Rescinded) Brake Balance Cables Fraying
	/76	(Rescinded) Primer Line Chafing Parking Brake Control
	/77	(Rescinded)
	/78	(Rescinded) Oil Tank Inlet Hose
	/79	(Rescinded)
3 Jul 57	/80	Cowling Wrapper Sheet Wear
	/81	(Rescinded) Wing Skin Wear
	/82	(Rescinded)
	/83	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/91)
	/84	(Rescinded)
4 Mar 58	/85	Correction to Gyrosyn Compass Wiring
	/86	(Rescinded) Brake Hose Line Chafing
	/87	(Rescinded) Cure Date Tag Removal
	/88	(Rescinded) Floor Channel Cracking
29 Aug 58	/89	Undercarriage Down Limit Switches
	/90	(Rescinded) Landing Gear Chain Lock Nuts
20 Oct 58	/91	Wing Flap Fire Hazard

LATEST DATE	EO NUMBER	TITLE
27 Jun 61	05-45B-5/92	Deletion of Adjusting Nut Torque Values Stamped on Brake Cylinder Head
29 Oct 58	/93	Radio Junction Box 3MBA-4803
9 Jan 59	/94	Repair Links of Aileron Control Column Cable
20 Jan 59	/95	Generator Failure Warning Light Relays
21 Jan 59	/96	Failure of Pilot's Seat Attaching Bracket
	/97	(Rescinded)
	/98	Replaced by EO 05-45B-5/103
	/99	(Assigned)
	/100	(Rescinded) Lower Slide Tube Cluster, Main Truss
	/101	(Rescinded) Bulkhead Thirteen
	/102	(Replaced by EO 05-45B-6A/174)
28 Oct 59	/103	Feathering Pump Motor Mounting Lugs
4 Nov 59	/104	Propeller Feathering Switches
	/105	(Rescinded) Corrosion of Fuel and De-Icing Lines
18 Mar 60	/106	SCR 274N Antenna Installation
	/107	(Rescinded) Fuel Gauge - Tank Unit
	/108	(Rescinded) Nose Landing Gear Door Swivel
	/109	(Rescinded) Linoil Seepage From Mainplane Spars
	/110	(Rescinded) Co-pilot's Rudder Pedal LH
	/111	(Cancelled)
23 May 61	/112	Rudder Trim Light Socket Part 209 Shorting on Housing
4 Jul 61	/113	Clearance of Wiring and Terminal Lugs

LATEST DATE	EO NUMBER	TITLE
28 Jun 61	05-45B-5/114	Tail Wheel Lock Cable - Wear Strip at Bulkhead 13
28 Nov 63	/115	Feathering Switches
31 Jul 61	/116	Aileron Control Stops
8 Mar 62	/117	Aircraft Fuel Nozzle Grounding Sockets
28 Feb 62	/118	Fire Extinguisher Installation
31 May 62	/119	Chafing of Rigid Tube Assemblies
5 Jul 62	/120	Elevator Control Cables
19 Feb 63	/121	Disconnecting and Stowing of Power Leads
6 Oct 64	/122	Truss Tube Members
18 Nov 64	/123	Hinge Pin in Inspection Door for Magnasyn Compass Transmitter
30 Dec 64	/124	Wing Spar Bushings
29 Sep 65	/125	Main Landing Gear Safety Switch Wiring
1 Nov 65	/126	Insulating of Voltage Regulator Control Rheostat Box Assembly Test Receptacles
7 Apr 66	/127	Link Assemblies Rudder Controls
	/128	(Rescinded)
14 Sep 66	/129	Inspection of Horizontal Stabilizer Ribs for Buckling - Cracking
5 Apr 67	/130	Polarity of Fire Detection Circuit
1 Aug 67	/131	X-Ray Inspection of Centre Section Lower Elliptical Spar Caps
14 Jul 67	/132	RH and LH Elevator Control Column for Cracks



LATEST DATE	EO NUMBER	TITLE
29 Sep 67	05-45B-5/133	Center Section Truss Reinforcement Plates for Weld Cracks
24 Jan 68	/134	Dye Check for Weld Cracks Spar Reinforcement Spice Plates
10 Nov 67	/135	Main Spar Attachments Bolts (Security)
30 Nov 67	/136	Left Hand Landing Light Wire Bundle Chafing
31 Jan 68	/137	Battery Master Switch Protection
2 Feb 68	/138	Reference RPM Decal
26 Nov 68	/139	Rudder Trim Tab Controls
*12 Feb 69	/140	Chafing - LH Propeller Pitch Control and Adjacent Wire Bundle
* 9 May 69	/141	Nose Tank Fuel Vent Line
*24 Nov 69	/142	Primer Pump Flex Line Deterioration
*30 Dec 69	/143	Battery Installation



* Asterisks appearing opposite entries denote changes since last issue

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BATTERY INSTALLATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
TRAINING AIDS AFFECTED:	Nil
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Primary Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	IE Tech
FORM ENTRIES:	CF335, CF337
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure sufficient clearance exists between the battery terminals (Figure 1) and the battery retaining frame, to prevent any chance of a short circuit between them.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection will be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove the battery compartment covers.

(b) Inspect the battery installation to ensure that sufficient clearance exists between the battery terminals and the retaining frame.

(c) If insufficient clearance exists, the following steps are to be taken:

(1) Remove the battery retaining frame.

(2) Cut or file out a section of the top of the frame around the terminals, 1-1/2" long and 3/4" deep. To prevent accidental short circuiting while the battery frame is being installed, a piece of hard rubber is to be glued into the cut away section, see Figure 1.

(3) Replace and secure the battery retaining frame.

(d) Replace the battery compartment covers.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately one man-hour is required to carry out this inspection.

(b) This special inspection originates as a result of CFB Portage La Prairie UCR #9226/A84.



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Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
CFHQ/CTS/DAM3-5-5

CANADIAN FORCES

EO 05-45B-5/142
24 Nov 69

SPECIAL INSPECTION
PRIMER PUMP FLEX LINE DETERIORATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Primer Pump Flex Line
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
TRAINING AIDS AFFECTED:	Nil
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AE Tech
FORM ENTRIES:	CF349, CF354
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To inspect fuel pump flex line Part MS28741-4-0080.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Remove wrapper assembly LH outboard Part 1855850P-16.

(b) Locate and remove hose assembly Part MS326741-4-0080 EO 05-45B-4 Part 2 Figure 58 Index 69.

(c) Manufacture new hose assembly and install.

(d) Using wobble pump build up pressure to check for fuel leaks.

(e) Replace wrapper sheet.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This SI is a result of a incident in which a ruptured fuel primer pump line caused a aircraft to catch fire.

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Prepared by:
CFHQ/CTS/DAM3-4-4

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SPECIAL INSPECTION

NOSE TANK FUEL VENT LINE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Vent Line Nose Tank
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
FORM ENTRIES:	CF337, CF354, CF356
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS	NA

PURPOSE

1 To ensure nose tank fuel vent line protrudes aircraft skin for proper venting.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Fuel vent line nose tank Part 404-189832 EO 05-45B-4 Part 2 Figure 57 Index 15. Ensure vent line protrudes aircraft skin to such an extent that the drilled hole in the vent line is on the outside of aircraft skin.

(b) Secure line with a suitable clamp.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 1 man-hour is required to carry out this inspection.

(b) This inspection is a result of CFB Portage La Prairie FS244 and FS242.

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Prepared by:
CFHQ/CTS/DAM3-4

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LOGLIFT EXPEDITOR

EXPEDITOR TECHNICAL EO-05-45B-5/140

THE AMEND EQUIPMENT EFFECTED TO READ L.H. PROPELLER PITCH CONTROL

NOT MODIFIED TO EO 05-45B-6A/112 CONFIGURATION

BT



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

CANADIAN FORCES

EO 05-45B-5/140
12 Feb 69

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING - LH PROPELLER PITCH CONTROL AND ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	LH Propeller Pitch Control not modified to 05-45B-6A/112 Configuration. *
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor
TRAINING AIDS AFFECTED:	Nil
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AE Tech, IE Tech
FORM ENTRIES:	CF337, CF354
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure sufficient clearance exists between LH propeller pitch control attaching bolt and adjacent wire bundle. To prevent any danger of chafing between the two.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Gain access to the back of the control pedestal through the nose baggage door and by removing panel Part 404-184036, EO 05-45B-4, Figure 57, Index 33. AE Tech shall remove the cotter pin AN380-2-2, nut AN310-3 and bolt AN3-11 which attach the LH propeller control Part 189095-2, Figure 55, Index 58, to the propeller control lever Part 644-189056, Figure 54, Index 87. Re-install the bolt in the reverse direction so that the flat head of the bolt will face the adjacent wire bundle. IE Tech shall check to ensure that the wire bundle leading to the landing gear control panel is secured in such a manner as to give maximum clearance between it and the LH propeller control lever.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 It is estimated approximately 3 man-hours will be required to carry out this special inspection.

* DAM 344052 12 Jun 69.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
CFHQ/CTS/DAM3-4-4

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R. C. A. F. MESSAGE

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TO CANLOGPROP

RCCPMR 410 R 3120302
ORIG. No. DATE OCT 68

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CLASSIFICATION:

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SPECIAL INSPECTION

A. STABILIZER ASSEMBLY HORIZONTAL. EO 05-45B-5/139. NSN 1560-21-811-16

B. RUDDER TAB CONTROL CABLES

C. EXPEDITOR

D. OPERATING UNITS CONTRACTORS AMDU AND SUPPLY DEPOTS

E. BEFORE OR NOT LATER THAN NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION

F. AF TECH

G. CF 337 CF354 CF 358

H. DEPOT AND UNIT STABLES TO BE INSPECTED PRIOR ISSUE

J. MESSAGE TO CFHQ AND CHQ

LOSS OF RUDDER TAB CONTROL DURING FLIGHT DUE TO DISENGAGEMENT OF CABLE AND CHAIN

K. GAIN ACCESS TO RUDDER BELLCRANK AND RUDDER TAB 90 DEGREE DRIVE THROUGH LH AND RH INSPECTION PANELS NUMBER 3, EO 05-45B-2 FIG 1-13 CHECK TO INSURE CHAIN TO CABLE CONNECTION IS MAINTAINED BY PIN FLAT HEAD AN 393-11 AND COTTER PIN AN 380-2-2 OR PIN 102809-478-012 RIVETTED. ALL FOUR CONNECTIONS TO BE CHECKED.

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FORM BAW 1028-12 66

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FROM

TO:

ORIG. NO. DATE

PAGE 2 RCCPMT 410 UNCLAS

N. 30 MINS

P. CFB PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE FS 146 221830Z OCT REFERS.

BT

RESCINDED

AUTH .....

AUTHORIZED

FORM BAW 2028-12-66

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RUDDER TRIM TAB CONTROLS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Stabilizer Assembly Horizontal (1560-21-811-1685)
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor
TRAINING AIDS AFFECTED:	NA
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors, AMDU, Supply Depots
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than next Primary Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech
FORM ENTRIES:	CF337, CF354, CF358
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Inspected prior to issue
RETURNS:	Positive cases of cotter pins not secured to be reported to CFHQ/DAM3-4

PURPOSE

1 To check rudder trim tab control cable and chain connections.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Gain access to rudder bellcrank and rudder tab 90 degree drive through LH and RH inspection panels #3. EO 05-45B-2 Figure 1-13.

(b) Check to ensure chain and cable connections are maintained by pin flat head (AN393-11) and cotter pin (AN380-2-2) or pin 102809-A078-012 rivetted.

(c) Check all four connections.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 30 minutes are required to carry out this inspection.

(b) This inspection is a result of CFB Portage La Prairie FS 146 221830Z.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
CFHQ/CTS/DAM3-4

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CANADIAN FORCES

EO 05-45B-5/138
2 Feb 68

SPECIAL INSPECTION

REFERENCE RPM DECAL

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	NA
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	I and E Tech, AE Tech.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	CF335 and CF337
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Message to MATCOM and CHQ.

PURPOSE

1 To standardize location of reference RPM decals on instrument panel.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection will be carried out as follows:

(a) Locate former reference RPM decals on instrument panel, remove and discard.

(b) Using embossing machine 7490-21-803-7415 and tape 7510-21-803-6934 (red) manufacture a decal using words: "PORT REF/RPM STBD" and affix to instrument panel RH side between "ASI" and altimeter, see Figure 1.

(c) Refer to CF339 form for "REF/RPM" for the applicable aircraft, manufacture two decals, to be affixed under "PORT REF/RPM STBD" decal, with the applicable REF/RPM designation PORT and STBD, as per Figure 1.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) It is estimated that 1 man-hour per aircraft will be required to carry out this special inspection.

(b) This special inspection originates as a result of CFB Portage La Prairie UCR 7226/A236.

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

Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA5
2

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BATTERY MASTER SWITCH PROTECTION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	CF337, CF354
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Message to MATCOM and CHQ.

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the battery master switch Part MS35059-22 is protected by rubber nipple Ref. 5975-21-806-2486 to prevent cowl flap handle from contacting the switch terminals.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Make a visual inspection of the battery master switch Part MS35059-22 on the pilot sub-panel to ensure nipple Ref. 5975-21-806-2486 is installed as per Figure 1.

(b) If found without, disconnect aircraft batteries.

(c) Disconnect wires from the switch.

(d) Slip on nipple Ref. 5976-21-806-2486.

(e) Reconnect wires.

(f) Slip the nipple back to cover the whole switch, as per Figure 1.

(g) Tie the small end of the nipple with wax string.

(h) Reconnect batteries.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) It is estimated one man-hour will be required to carry out this special inspection.

(b) This special inspection originates as a result of UCR 7226/A199.

(c) EO 05-45B-6A/129 will be rescinded.

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Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA5

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LEFT HAND LANDING LIGHT WIRE BUNDLE CHAFING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	NA
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than the next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	Instrument and Electrical
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	CF337 and CF354
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Message to MATCOM and CHQ.

PURPOSE

1 Instances have occurred where the power lead to the left-hand landing light assembly shorted to wing rib #3, causing a slight damage to the rib and burning the adjacent wire #186.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection will be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove left-hand landing light assembly from aircraft wing.

(b) Inspect wire #194 and #186 to a length of approximately 7" from the landing light connector and repair if necessary, see Figure 1.

(c) Using approximately 7" of tubing Ref. 4720-21-819-2241 slit lengthwise, cover the wire bundle starting at the plug and tie with wax string. This will prevent the wires from shorting against the rib, see Figure 2.

(d) Replace and secure landing light assembly to the wing and make proper entries in CF forms 337 and 354.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The estimated time required to carry out this inspection is one man-hour.

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

Figure 1



Figure 2

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA5

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

SPECIAL INSPECTION

MAIN SPAR ATTACHMENT BOLTS (SECURITY)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Wing Front Spar Attachment Bolts
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Primary Inspection, but not later than 30 Nov 67
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES	L14-1B, L14-5
RETURNS:	Positive cases to MATCOM by message

PURPOSE

1 A case has been reported whereby improper lockwiring procedures of wing hinge (front spar) fitting bolts resulted in looseness of spar hinge bolt and nut assembly. (Refer to EO 05-45B-4 Part 2 Figure 2, Items 2 and 3 Part 182061-1, Part 18206-2.)

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following inspection data applies:

(a) Gain access through the wheel well areas and carry out a visual check of both the forward upper and lower main spar wing attachment bolts for proper lockwiring procedures. (Note Port same as starboard side).

(b) Installation of safety wire must be such that it would be put in tension in the event nut started to loosen.

(c) Safety wiring of referenced bolt and nut assembly is outlined in Figure 2-22 of EO 05-45B-2, Part 2, Section 2, Page 2-18.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 10 minutes are required to accomplish the inspection portion of this SI.

(b) This SI is the result of Candefwash AO 498 131916Z dated Oct 67.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA4

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
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FEB 19 1969
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PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

DYE CHECK FOR WELD CRACKS SPAR REINFORCEMENT SPLICE PLATES

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/134 dated 3 Nov 67)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Centre Section
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft Serials 2323, 2334, 2340, 5189 and 2336
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Periodic Inspection after minimum 150 and maximum 300 flying hours subsequent to embodiment of EO 05-45B-6B/8 but not later than 31 May 68
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech, Metal Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
RETURNS:	Positive results are to be reported by priority MSG to MATCOM HQ

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the following splice plates for possible weld cracks:

(a) The left and right-hand lower elliptical tube splice plate welds of fuselage centre section attachment fittings.

(b) The left and right-hand lower elliptical tube splice plate welds at inboard and outboard ends of the main landing gear lower slide tube welded cluster.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the inspection requirements:

(a) The inspection procedure outlined in SI EO 05-45B-5/133 dated 23 Sep 67 is to be followed, to dye check for possible weld cracks of centre section truss reinforcement plates (i.e. located outboard of the splice plate weld of the fuselage centre section attachment fittings).

(b) Inspection requirements for dye check of slide tube cluster reinforcement plate welds, (i.e. located at left and right-hand lower elliptical tubes at the inboard and outboard ends of the welded cluster at the lower landing gear slide tube) is as follows:

(1) Remove cabin heat control cable and oil shut off control cable and clamps.

(2) Remove de-icer distributor valve supporting hat section, disconnect de-icer fluid lines.

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(3) Remove lower portion of bulkhead, aft of the slide tube cluster, by removing rivets which attach the bulkhead to the slide plates and the wheel well nacelle.

(4) Strip paint off area where dye check is to be carried out.

(5) Using dye penetrant method; i.e. fluorescent and blacklight and/or dye and developer, visually inspect the fillet welds for possible cracks within the weld beads.

(6) Clean and refinish.

(7) Re-install bulkhead and equipment removed as per paragraphs (1) and (2).

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 110 man-hours will be required to accomplish this SI.

(b) Inspection penetrant cleaner, dye solution and developer are available under the following Ref. 6850-21-804-4782, 6850-21-804-4783 and 6850-21-804-4784.

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ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA4-4

bristol aerospace limited
A MEMBER OF THE BRISTOL GROUP

A/C Planning

R. C. A. F. MESSAGE

CANMATCOM 082100z 11510JU-4

CFB PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE 10TSU LANCASTER PARK
CFB PORDEN 10TSU WINNIPEG
CFB RIVERS 1.04TSD WINNIPEG
CFB WINNIPEG
1005TSD SASKATOON

ORIG NO ACAE1253 DATE 8 SEP 67

CANTRAINCOM

SUBJECT: EXPEDITOR SPECIAL INSPECTION EO 05-45B-5/133

REF: MATCOM ACAE 1275 011700Z SEP

AMEND ADDITIONAL DATA, PARA (A) ~~XXXX~~ SUB PARA (II) OF ABOVE REF MSG TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING. QUOTE 50 PERCENT OF ALL EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT MODIFIED TO EO 05-45B-6B/8 INSPECTED AS PER REF SI, WHEREBY NO WELD CRACKS REPEAT NO WELD CRACKS WERE FOUND DURING THE INITIAL INSPECTION, AND TO HAVE THE CONTENTS OF THIS SI REPEATED ONCE ONLY AFTER THE FIRST 50 FLYING HOURS. UNQUOTE.

SEP 11 1967
BRISTOL AEROSPACE LIMITED

BURNAND
CHAN
DAVIDSON
EILER
L TOCKI
BIRNIE

RAY JACK DES
TOM ~~JOHN~~ MAL
FILE

RELEASE IS AUTHORIZED
BY ENGINEERING
DATE PROJECT ENGINEER

RESCINDED
AUTH

bristol aerospace limited
A MEMBER OF THE BRISTOL GROUP

A/C Planning

R. C. A. F. MESSAGE

FROM: CANMATCOM 011700Z 11510JU-4

TO: CFB PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE
CFB BORDEN
CFB RIVERS
CFB WINNIPEG
1005TSD RCAF SASKATOON
10TSU LANCASTER PARK
10TSU DET WINNIPEG
1004TSD WINNIPEG

ORIG No ACAE1275 DATE 1 SEP 67

BURNAND
CHAN
DAVIDSON
EILER
LATOCKI
BIRNIE

ATION: CANTRAINCOM

SUBJECT: SPECIAL INSPECTION EO 05-45B-5/133

REF: 1004TSD TECH 114 292200Z AUG

A SPECIAL INSPECTION EO 05-45B-5/133 INSPECTION OF LH AND RH CENTER SECTION TRUSS REINFORCEMENT PLATES FOR WELD CRACKS

B CENTER SECTION TRUSS REINFORCEMENT PLATES, BOTTOM WING ROOT REINFORCEMENT WELD

C ALL EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT MODIFIED TO EO ~~05X45XX~~ 05-45B-6B/8 AS OF THIS ~~XXX~~ DATE

D OPERATING UNITS AND CONTRACTORS

E ON OR BEFORE NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION BUT NOT LATER THAN 15 SEP 67

F ~~XXX~~ AFTECH AND METAL TECH

G L14-1B AND L14-5

H ON COMPLETION OF THIS INSPECTION, POSITIVE RESULTS ARE TO BE REPORTED BY PRIORITY MESSAGE TO MATCOM HQ. REPORT AND RECORD LENGTH OF CRACKS FOUND

J THIS SI IS THE RESULT OS WELD CRACKS DISCOVERED ON EXPEDITOR A/C MODIFIED TO EO 05-45B-6B/8. TO INSPECT THE TRUSS TUBE MEMBER, REF EO 05-45B-3, PART 2, PAGE ~~XXX~~ 24, FIG 2-3, ITEM 5, ALONG THE INBOARD FILLET WELD OF REINFORCEMENT PLATE.

K THE FOLLOWING IS THE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS, TO INSPECT FOR POSSIBLE WELD CRACKS, THE LOWER REINFORCEMENT PLATE FILLET WELD

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FORM BAW

RAY JACK DES
TOM JOHN MAL
FILE

R. C. A. F. MESSAGE

ORIG No. ACAE1275 DATE

I AT A POINT OF THE CENTER WING SECTION TO THE FUSELAGE FILLET, 17 AND ONE HALF INCHES INBOARD OF JACKING REAR SCREW HOLE, REMOVE FIRST NINE RIVETS (FORWARD) SECURING INBOARD EDGE OF FILLET. REMOVE FIRST NINE RIVETS (OUTBOARD) SECURING FILLET AND LOWER WING PANEL.
CAUTION: WHILE DRILLING THE NINE RIVETS ON INBOARD EDGE OF FILLET USE DRILL STOP SET AT 1/2 INCH TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO MAIN SPAR.
II CLEAN INBOARD WELD OF TRUSS TUBE LOWER REINFORCEMENT PLATE, WHICH IS VISIBLE IMMEDIATELY ABOVE OPENING, USING THE ZY-GLOW KIT OR DYE PENETRANT CLEANER.
III USING DYE PENETRANT METHOD (IE FLOURESCENT AND BLACK LIGHT XNEX AND/OR DYE AND DEVELOPER) VISUALLY INSPECT THE FILLET WELD ON INBOARD PORTION OF THE LOWER WING ROOT REINFORCEMENT PLATE (LH AND RH) FOR POSSIBLE CRACKS WITHIN THE WELD BEAD.
IV WHILE APPLYING THE PENETRANT SOLUTION, FLEX A/C WING TIP, AS THIS WILL ENSURE PENETRATION OF PENETRANT IF WELD CRACKS ARE IN THE AREA. NOTE: EO 05-45B-3, PART2, PAGE 38, FIG 2-2 OUTLINES BOTH UPPER AND LOWER DRAG TUBE FITTING SPLICE. SPLICE PLATES INSTALLED AS A RESULT OF EO 05-45B-6B/8 WERE FITTED TO THE LEFT AND RIGHT HAND LOWER ELLIPTICAL TUBES JUST OUTBOARD OF THE SPLICE PLATE WELD OF THE FUSELAGE CENTER SECTION ATTACHMENT FITTINGS. RIGHT OF DETAIL ONE, LOWER DRAG TUBE FITTING SPLICE (FIG 2-20) IS THE AREA IN QUESTION TO BE INSPECTED

PROCESSED

bristol aerospace limited
A MEMBER OF THE BRISTOL GROUP

R. C. A. F. MESSAGE

FROM

ORIG No ACAE1275 DATE

INFORMATION:

L NSN 5320-00-754-2078 CR163/5/4 RIVETS EA 7, NSN 5320-00-391-7800 CR 163/5/6 RIVETS EA 8, NSN ~~xx~~ 5320-00-117-7338 CR 163/5/8 RIVETS EA 3 M I APPROXIMATELY FOUR MAN HOURS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLICH THIS SPECIAL INSPECTION.

II WHERE EVIDENCE OF CRACKS ARE FOUND, AND TO DETERMINE IF CRACKS HAVE PROGRESSED, THE CONTENTS OF THIS SI IS TO BE REPEATED EVERY 25 HOURS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AIRCRAFT ARE REPAIRED BY FLY-IN TO CONTRACTORS.

III INSPECTION PENETRANT CLEANER, DYE SOLUTION, AND DEVELOPER ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE FOLLOWING NSN 6850-21-804-4782, 6850-21-804-4783 AND 6850-21-804-4784.

IV FOR YOUR INFORMATION. CRACKS FOUND IN THIS AREA ARE NOT STRUCTURALLY CRITICAL AND ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, THE SAME CRACKS WHICH RESULTED IN THE TRUSS INSPECTION AND 6B/8 MOD. BRISTOL IS DEVELOPING A REPAIR SCHEME AND WHEN ACCEPTABLE TO MATCOM IT IS PROPOSED TO HAVE REPAIR SCHEME CARRIED OUT BY A FLY-IN REPAIR ON A ONE A/C IN AND ONE A/C OUT BASIS.

V THIS SI IS THE RESULT OF 1004TSD TECH 114 292200Z AUG 67

AUTH

ENGINEER

FORM BAW 2020 12-65

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CENTER SECTION TRUSS REINFORCEMENT PLATES FOR WELD CRACKS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Center Section.
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft modified to EO 05-45B-6B/8.
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units and Contractors.
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection but not later than 15 Sep 67
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech, Metal Tech.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5.
RETURNS:	On completion of this inspection, positive results are to be reported by priority message to MATCOM HQ. REPORT and RECORD length of cracks found.

PURPOSE

1 This special inspection is the result of weld cracks discovered on Expeditor aircraft modified to EO 05-45B-6B/8. To inspect the truss tube member, (refer to EO 05-45B-3, Part 2, Page 24, Figure 2-3, Item 5), along the inboard fillet weld of reinforcement plate.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the inspection requirements, to inspect for possible weld cracks, the lower reinforcement plate fillet weld.

(a) At a point of the center wing section to the fuselage fillet, 17-1/2" inboard of jacking rear screw hole, remove first nine rivets (forward) securing inboard edge of fillet. Remove first nine rivets (outboard) securing fillet and lower wing panel.

CAUTION

While drilling the nine rivets on inboard edge of fillet use drill stop set at 1/2" to prevent damage to main spar.

(b) Clean inboard weld of truss tube lower reinforcement plate, which is visible immediately above opening, using the Zy-Glow kit or dye penetrant cleaner.

(c) Using dye penetrant method (ie fluorescent and black light and/or dye and developer) visually inspect the fillet weld on inboard portion of the lower wing root reinforcement plate (LH and RH) for possible cracks within the weld bead.

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(d) While applying the penetrant solution, flex aircraft wing tip, as this will ensure penetration of penetrant if weld cracks are in the area.

NOTE

EO 05-45B-3, Part 2, Page 38, Figure 2-2 outlines both upper and lower drag tube fitting splice. Splice plates installed as a result of EO 05-45B-6B/8 were fitted to the left and right-hand lower elliptical tubes just outboard of the splice plate weld of the fuselage center section attachment fittings. Right of detail one, lower drag tube fitting splice (Figure 2-20) is the area in question to be inspected.

PARTS REQUIRED:

3 The following parts are required for each aircraft, and may be obtained through RCAF Sources.

RCAF STOCK NO.	PART	DESCRIPTION	QTY.
5320-00-754-2078	CR163/5/4	Rivets	7
5320-00-391-7800	CR163/5/6	Rivets	8
5320-00-117-7338	CR163/5/8	Rivets	3

ADDITIONAL DATA

4 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately four man-hours will be required to accomplish this special inspection.

(b) Where evidence of cracks is found, and to determine if cracks have progressed, the content of this SI is to be repeated every 25 hours until such time as aircraft are repaired by fly-in to contractors. 50% of all Expeditor aircraft modified to EO 05-45B-6B/8 inspected, whereby no weld cracks, repeat NO weld cracks are found during the initial inspection, are to have the contents of this SI repeated once only after the first 50 flying hours.

(c) Inspection penetrant cleaner, dye solution, and developer are available under the following Ref. 6850-21-804-4782, 6850-21-804-4783 and 6850-21-804-4784.

(d) Cracks found in this area are not structurally critical and are not, repeat not, the same cracks which resulted in the truss inspection and 6B/8 modification. BAL (1004 TSD) Winnipeg is developing a repair scheme and when acceptable to MATCOM it is proposed to have repair scheme carried out by a fly in repair on a one aircraft in and one aircraft out basis.

(e) This SI is the result of BAL (1004 TSD) Winnipeg Tech 114 29220Z dated Aug 67.

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ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SOEVA4-4

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RH AND LH ELEVATOR CONTROL COLUMN FOR CRACKS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	RH and LH Elevator Control Assemblies Part 404-187510, 404-187510-1
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection - but not later than 7 Jul 67.
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
RETURNS:	On completion of this inspection - positive results are to be reported by MSG to MATCOM HQ.

PURPOSE

1 This special inspection is the result of a Before Flight Inspection on a US Navy C-45 aircraft, whereby the lower vertical tube had separated from the upper diagonal tube of elevator control column assembly.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the inspections requirements to inspect Parts 404-187510 and 404-187510-1 RH and LH elevator control column assemblies for cracks.

(a) Using the dye penetrant method of inspection, clean and visually inspect the RH and LH elevator control column assemblies for cracks at junction of the vertical and diagonal tubes.

(b) The inspection encompasses an area extending 6" in each direction from the junction of the vertical and diagonal tubes of control column. (Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Page 236, Figure 61, Index 19 and 20).

NOTE

During inspection pay particular attention to the welded areas, i.e. reinforcements and junction of diagonal tube on which the control wheel is mounted, and vertical tube of control column which extends towards the cockpit floor.

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(c) Where cracks or evidence of cracks are found the control column assembly affected, RH or LH is to be replaced with a serviceable assembly.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately two man-hours will be required to accomplish the inspection portion of this Special Inspection.

(b) Aircraft being processed through BAL (1004 TSD Winnipeg) for modification EO 05-45B-6B/8 are to be inspected when they return to parent unit.

(c) Inspection penetrant cleaner, dye solution, and developer are available under the following NSN's 6850-21-804-4782, 6850-21-804-4783 and 6850-21-804-4784.

(d) Matcom Message ACAE 1266 291555 dated Jun 67 refers.

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ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SSOAC/AE3

SPECIAL INSPECTION

X-RAY INSPECTION OF CENTRE SECTION LOWER ELLIPTICAL SPAR CAPS

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/131 dated 31 May 67)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Centre Section Lower Elliptical Spar Cap
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	6 RD NDT Personnel
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than 15 Jun 67
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	6 RD NDT Personnel with assistance of Unit Personnel
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
RETURNS:	On completion of this inspection - all conditions are to be reported by MSG to MCHQ

PURPOSE

1 To carry out X-ray inspection of Expeditor centre section lower elliptical spar caps in accordance with Beechcraft Service Bulletins, 66-10, 64-17, 64-15, 64-16 and FAA Airworthiness Directive AD 67-8-2.

INSPECTION DATA

2 (Proposed by FAA Airworthiness Directive 67-8-2 on all UE Expeditor aircraft).

(a) This is a record type EO, this EO is not complete within itself. The purpose of this EO is to identify the Special Inspection, tabulate all affected Expeditor aircraft.

(b) Pending embodiment of modification EO 05-45B-6B/8 consisting of MPI inspection and permanent repair; the SI which is a stop-gap measure; is to be processed by 6 RD NDT personnel in accordance with the X-ray methods developed by 6 RD NDT Section. (6 RD WP 36 dated 15 May 67 refers).

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) MATCOM messages ACAE 1263 and ACAE 1264 dated 15 and 16 May 67 refer.

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

(b) This SI is the result of Beechcraft Service Bulletins 66-10 dated May 64, 64-15 dated Aug 64 revision dated Jan 65, 64-16 dated Aug 64 revision dated Dec 64, 64-17 dated Aug 64 revision dated Dec 64, 64-52 dated Dec 64 revision dated Feb 65 and FAA Airworthiness Directive AD 67-8-2.

(c) Approximately 12 man-hours will be required to accomplish this Special Inspection.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SSOAC/AE3

SPECIAL INSPECTION

POLARITY OF FIRE DETECTION CIRCUIT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Fire Detector System
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than 14 days after Receipt of Leaflet
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	Instrument and Electrical Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
RETURNS:	Positive cases by message to MATCOM HQ

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the polarity is correct in the fire detection circuit and that the alarm circuit is serviceable.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Switch DC power "ON".

(b) Carry out a polarity test of each thermocouple by applying a soldering iron or other safe heat source to the thermocouple and checking that the circuit responds via illumination of the fire warning light.

(c) If circuit fails to operate, troubleshoot and rectify.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) It is estimated that 2 man-hours will be required per aircraft, to carry out this special inspection.

(b) This special inspection originates as a result of CFB Winnipeg UCR 6220/A145.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SSOEL/EIS2

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SPECIAL INSPECTION

INSPECTION OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER RIBS FOR BUCKLING-CRACKING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Horizontal Stabilizer NSN 1560-21-811-1685
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Primary Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	AF Tech, Metal Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive Cases to be Reported by Omnibus UCR

PURPOSE

1 Cases of cracking and buckling damage in rib lightening hole areas, of the horizontal stabilizer have been reported.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This special inspection consists of visually inspecting the internal structure of horizontal stabilizer ribs, for signs of rib buckling, cracking etc. The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Using a light and mirror visually inspect the right and left-hand stabilizer rib numbers 1, 3, 5 and 7 for signs of buckling, cracks, etc. Pay particular attention to areas in and around rib lightening holes.

(b) Access for rib inspection can be gained through the horizontal stabilizer panels. (Refer to EO 05-45B-3, Part 3, Page 53, Figure 3-2, for location of inspection panels).

(c) Positive cases are to be repaired as per EO 05-45B-3, Part 3. Where the BAEO considers stabilizer repairs beyond unit capabilities, the assembly is to be replaced with a serviceable assembly.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies.

(a) Approximately one man-hour will be required to accomplish the inspection portion of this special inspection.

(b) This special inspection is the result of CFB Portage AME 653 dated 20 Jul 66.

(c) Material Command ACTM 3371 dated 21 Jul 66 refers.



ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SSOAC/TM3

BRISTOL AEROSPACE
LIMITED

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

FROM: CANMATCOM 132045Z 51-00-26JU

TO: LOGLIST EXPEDITOR ORIG. No. ACTM3362 DATE 13 J

INFORMATION

FROM AC/TM 3-2 PD EXPEDITOR TECHNICAL PD SPECIAL INSPECTION SD 05-45B-5/128 11 MAY 66 IS TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PD A NEW REVISED LEAFLET WILL BE ISSUED AT A LATER DATE PD CANTRAINCOM YOUR LOGS 8046 1015322 REFERS

E. BYRNE

BRISTOL AEROSPACE
LIMITED

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

FROM: CANMATCOM 111430Z 51-00-26JU

TO: LOGLIST EXPEDITOR ORIG. No ACTM3368 DATE 11 JUL

INFORMATION

FROM ACTM3-2 PD EXPEDITOR TECHNICAL PD FURTHER TO OUR ACTM3362 13 JUN SPECIAL INSPECTION SD 05-45B-5/128 11 MAY IS TO BE CANCELLED IN ITS ENTIRETY PD REVISIONS CONTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: IE TOLERANCES CMM INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF TAIL WHEEL FORK ASSEMBLIES WILL BE INCLUDED IN BOTH MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS AND REPAIR MANUALS FOR EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FORK ASSEMBLY - TAIL WHEEL

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Fork Assembly - Tail Wheel Part 404-188675
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before but not later than the next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	Airframe Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	All tail wheel fork assemblies are to be inspected before installation
RETURNS:	Nil Returns Required

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the tail wheel lock pin hole located in fork assembly Part 404-188675 is to the measurements specified in Drawing 404-188636, refer to Figure 1. Such a condition may restrict and prevent lock pin from fully engaging.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove the tail wheel swivel fork assembly Part 404-188675 from tail gear truss assembly Part 404-188680, refer to EO 05-45B-4, Part 2, Page 126, Figure 32, Index 23, 22.

(b) Measure the inside circumference of the lock pin hole to ensure the diameter of the hole conforms to Drawing 404-188636 refer to Figure 1; i.e., .505 to .520". Where the inside diameter of the hole is found elongated or beyond tolerances, the fork assembly is to be replaced.

(c) Inspect and ensure the upper edge of the lock pin hole has been chamfered in accordance with reference drawing. If chamfer is evident, no rework is required. However if chamfer is not evident, chamfer the upper edge, using a smooth half round file. Blend all sharp edges with fine sandpaper and crocus cloth.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 3 man-hours will be required to accomplish this SI.

(b) This SI is the result of UCR 6226/A53 dated 10 Mar 66.

RESCINDED
AUTH .....

RELEASE IS ~~IS NOT~~ AUTHORIZED
BY ENGINEERING
JUN 14 '88 (DATE) N. Chan (PROJECT ENGINEER)



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SAMO/TM3

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LINK ASSEMBLIES RUDDER CONTROLS

(This EO replaces LOG C3357 dated 9 Mar 66)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Link Assembly Part 404-186160
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	Airframe Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Nil returns required

PURPOSE

1 Binding conditions have been reported on the extreme rudder travel, caused by seizure of the rubber guide bushings located between the spring and rod. (Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 64, Part 404-186160).

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Remove both the rudder horn box assemblies Parts 186033 and 186033-1. (Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Part 2, Page 54, Figure 12, index 61 and 62).

(b) Visually and functionally inspect the rudder bellcrank link assemblies for freedom of movement, and ensure link assemblies are free of grease and dirt.

(c) Check the serviceability of both upper and lower guide bushings. Guide bushings Parts 404-186161 and 186164 are not shown in the above referenced EO.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) This Special Inspection requires approximately 30 minutes to complete.

(b) Units are to ink amend EO 05-45B-7A, dated 30 Sep 64, revised 10 Jan 66, Section 1, Page 21 by inserting the following:

"Item TU 3A. Inspect the rudder control link assemblies, spring and rubber guide bushings for serviceability. Free from dirt and grease, and freedom of movement, visual and functional. This inspection is to be carried out at every second check."

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SAMO/TM3

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
MAY 12 1966
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

BRISTOL AEROSPACE
LIMITED

E. B/A

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

FROM: CANMATCOM 091330Z 51-00-26JU

TO: LOGLIST EXPEDITOR

ORIG. No. LOGC3357 DATE 9 M

9MAR66

INFORMATION

A SPECIAL INSPECTION EO-05-45B5-127 LINK ASSEMBLY RUDDER CONTROL PD

B LINK ASSYS P/N 404-186160 PD

C EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT PD

D OPERATING UNITS CMM RDS AND CONTRACTORS PD

E ON OR BEFORE THE NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION PD

F AIRFRAME TECH

G L 14-1B AND L 14-5

H N/A

J NIL RETURNS REQUIRED

K BINDING CONDITION REPORTED ON THE EXTREME RUDDER TRAVEL CAUSED BY SEIZURE OF THE RUBBER GUIDE BUSHINGS LOCATED BETWEEN THE SPRING AND ROD PD (REF EO 05-45B-4 FIG 64 P/N 404-186160)

M INSPECT THE RUDDER BELL CRANK LINK ASSEMBLIES FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT CMM ENSURE LINK ASSYS ARE FREE OF GREASE AND DIRT PD CHECK THE SERVICEABILITY OF RUBBER GUIDE BUSHINGS PD

N THIS SPECIAL INSPECTION REQUIRES APPROX 30 MIN TO COMPLETE PD

P UNITS ARE TO INK AMEND EO 05-45B-7A DATED 30 SEP 64 REVISED 10 JAN 66 CMM

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

51-00-26JU

ORIG. No. LOGC3357 DATE 9 MAR

9 MAR 64

MATION

SECTION 1 CMM PAGE 21 BY INSERTING THE FOLLOWING ITEM TU 3A. INSPECT THE RUDDER AND CONTROL LINK ASSYS CMM SPRING RUBBER GUIDE BUSHINGS FOR SERVICEABILITY CMM FREE FROM DIRT AND GREASE CMM AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF CONTROLS VISUAL AND FUNCTIONAL PD THIS INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT EVERY SECOND CHECK

A/c Planning

E. Bianchi

BRISTOL AEROSPACE
LIMITED
R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

M: CANNATCOM 091330Z 51-00-26JU

TO: LOGLIST EXPEDITOR

ORIG. No. LOGC3357 DATE 9 MAR 66

INFORMATION

A SPECIAL INSPECTION EO-05-4585-127 LINK ASSEMBLY RUDDER CONTROL PD

B LINK ASSY P/N 404-186160 PD

C EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT PD

D OPERATING UNITS CMC RDS AND CONTRACTORS PD

E ON OR BEFORE THE NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION PD

F AIRFRAME TECH

G L 14-18 AND L 14-5

H N/A

J NIL RETURNS REQUIRED

K BINDING CONDITION REPORTED ON THE EXTREME RUDDER TRAVEL CAUSED BY SEIZURE OF THE RUBBER GUIDE BUSHINGS LOCATED BETWEEN THE SPRING AND ROD PD (REF EO 05-45B-4 FIG 64 P/N 404-186160)

M INSPECT THE RUDDER BELL CRANK LINK ASSEMBLIES FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT CMM ENSURE LINK ASSYS ARE FREE OF GREASE AND DIRT PD CHECK THE SERVICEABILITY OF RUBBER GUIDE BUSHINGS PD

N THIS SPECIAL INSPECTION REQUIRES APPROX 30 MIN TO COMPLETE PD

P UNITS ARE TO INK AMEND EO 05-45B-7A DATED 30 SEP 64 REVISED 10 JAN 66 CMM

RELEASE ~~IS NOT~~ IS AUTHORIZED BY ENGINEERING

DATE PROJECT ENGINEER

BURNAND
CHAN
DAVIDSON
EILER
LATOCKI

RESCINDED

FORM BAW 2028-10-05

BRISTOL AEROSPACE
LIMITED

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

51-00-26JU

FROM:

ORIG. No. LOGC3357 DATE 9 MAR 66

TO:

INFORMATION

SECTION 1 CH PAGE 21 BY INSERTING THE FOLLOWING ITEM TU 3A.. INSPECT THE RUDDER CONTROL LINK ASSYS OF SEALING RUBBER AND GUIDE BUSHINGS FOR SERVICEABILITY CLN FREE FROM DIRT AND GREASE CLN AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF CONTROLS VISUAL AND FUNCTIONAL PD THIS INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT EVERY SECOND CHECK

SPECIAL INSPECTION

INSULATING OF VOLTAGE REGULATOR CONTROL RHEOSTAT BOX ASSEMBLY TEST RECEPTACLES

(This EO replaces MC LOG F6821 dated 30 Sep 65)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Generator Circuit
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	E Tech A, M Tech
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases to MATCOM HQ

PURPOSE

1 To ensure phenolic sheet installed on voltage regulator rheostat box assembly to eliminate short circuiting between voltage test receptacles.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Inspect the voltage control rheostat box assembly to ensure phenolic sheet installed.

(b) If inspection reveals that the phenolic sheet is not installed, rework the voltage control box assembly by installing the phenolic sheet in accordance with EO 05-45B-6A/106 dated 1 Apr 58, paragraph 2(b) and Figure 5.

(c) Ensure retaining nuts on the test receptacles are secure.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) It is estimated that approximately one man-hour will be required to carry out this inspection which will include any rework required.

(b) This special inspection originated as a result of Training Command Message AE3230 dated 28 Oct 65.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
MATCOM/SAVO/IES2

SPECIAL INSPECTION

MAIN LANDING GEAR SAFETY SWITCH WIRING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Main Landing Gear Safety Switch Wiring
AIRCRAFT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than at the next Periodic Inspection
TRADE(S) AFFECTED:	E Tech A
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the wire cable from the safety switch is properly routed and clamped (Ref. EO 05-1-3/9, paragraph 17, sub-paragraph (d)).

INSPECTION DATA

2 Cases have been reported of improper routing and clamping of the landing gear safety switch wiring. On some Expeditor aircraft this wire cable was found to be taped to the RH and LH hydraulic brake lines. Refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 22, items 15 and 16, as shown in Figure 1. The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Inspect the wiring routed to the landing gear safety switches. Refer EO 05-45B-2, Figure 11-10 (Issue 2), Page 11-25.

(b) Wiring found routed and clamped incorrectly, to be relocated and secured to the hydraulic line with two Adel #4 clamps, refer to Figure 2.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 It is estimated that the incorporation of this inspection will require approximately 1 man-hour assuming that rectification is required.



Figure 1



Figure 2

Prepared by:
MC/SAVO/IES2

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
OCT 22 1965
ACC.
ENG.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

WING SPAR BUSHINGS

(This EO replaces AMC LOG C6081 dated 24 Nov 64)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported to AMCHQ by message

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the bushings in the wing attachment fittings have been correctly reamed as a report has been received where the bushings were found to be incorrectly reamed causing elongation of the hole and resulting in less than 5% contact of the bolt to the bushing.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Remove upper and lower, left and right-hand nuts Part 18206-2, from wing front spar (Ref. EO 05-45B-4, Page 16, Figure 2, index 3). Do not remove bolts Part 1820-6-1 from wing front spar. After removing the referenced nuts inspect end of bolts to ascertain the spar bolts are properly seated in the bushing.

(b) If the bolt is not seated properly, remove bolt Part 18206-1 and inspect as detailed in EO 05-45B-2, Page 2-17, Part 2, Section 2, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph(u).

(c) On re-assembly, install nuts Part 18206-2, tighten and safety.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Approximately three man-hours are required for this inspection.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAMO/TM3

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
JAN 21 1965
ACC.
ENG.
PLANT

1056-1 Amdt

SPECIAL INSPECTION

HINGE PIN IN INSPECTION DOOR FOR MAGNASYN COMPASS TRANSMITTER

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft with Inspection Door for Magnasyn Compass
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RD and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before Next Flight
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not Required

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the hinge pin in the inspection door of the magnasyn compass transmitter for security. Reports have been received stating that this hinge pin has worked out of the hinge allowing the leading edge of the door to drop into the air stream.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspect piano wire hinge pin on access door for the magnasym compass transmitter. The 16" x 8" inspection door is located on the lower surface of the starboard mainplane between wing ribs 8 and 9, and 16" aft of the leading edge. Rectification action is to replace hinge wire if required and outboard ends of hinge are to be crimped to secure hinge pin.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) AMCHQ message LOG C6052 dated 13 Oct 64 preceded this Special Inspection leaflet.

(b) Estimated one man-hour required for this inspection.

(c) EO 05-45B-7A, Section 1, item GE 2 will be amended to include "Hinge Wires".

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAMO/TM3

STANDARD AERO ENG'G
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
DEC 8 1964
ACC.
ENG.
IN 30
PLANT

BRISTOL AERO-INDUSTRIES LIMITED

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

FM: CANAIRMAT 20/1650Z 51-00-26JU

TO: LOGLIST EXPEDITOR 101KU DARTMOUTH

ORIG. No. LOGC6076 DATE 20 NOV

1005TSD SASKATOON CARAIRLON CJSLTSD PRESTWICK

INFORMATION

FROM AM/TM3-5 EXPEDITOR TECHNICAL PD ADDENDUM TO 05-45B-5/122 TRUSS TUBE MEMBERS PD TO PARA 2 SECT PARA (D) ADD AND AREA AFT OF LOWER CLAMP PN189211 ON TRUSS TUBE NUMBER 28 WHERE THE SHROUD EXHAUST PIPE MAY TOUCH PD INDENTED CLEARANCE BETWEEN EXHAUST SHROUD AND TRUSS TUBE MEMBER SHOULD BE .01 TO .125

FORM BAW 2028-7-64

1006-1 Amdt

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/122
6 Oct 64

SPECIAL INSPECTION

TRUSS TUBE MEMBERS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units RD and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Units are to report positive cases and if necessary request fly-in repair to AMCHQ by message. Repair will be effected on a fly-in basis

PURPOSE

1 To inspect truss tube members #122 and 28 left and right-hand (Ref. EO 05-45B-3, Figure 2-3) to determine if deterioration has been caused by the clamps tail pipe bracket Part 189211 upper and 189213 lower (Ref. EO 05-45B-4, Figure 39, items 5 and 6).

INSPECTION DATA

2 The inspection is to be carried out in the following sequence and will apply to both left and right-hand brackets. Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 39 for item numbers mentioned in the following paragraphs:

(a) Remove bolts, item 2, upper and lower.

(b) Remove bolts, item 4, upper and lower.

(c) Disconnect shackle assembly bracket, item 7.

(d) Tap the clamps gently to loosen and slide clamps along the tube truss members to clear the area of installation.

(e) Inspect these areas to ascertain if any wear has occurred to the tube truss members. If wear is evident proceed as follows:

(1) Remove paint or other protective coating from the area affected and approximately 1" on either side.

(2) With a micrometer measure diameter of tube immediately adjacent to the area affected.

(3) With a micrometer measure the worn area. The maximum permissible wear to the tube truss member is 0.010". Aircraft may be ferried for a fly-in repair provided the deterioration has not progressed beyond 0.040".

See T769 23 Nov 64.

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(f) On re-assembly, ensure that the correct torque is applied to the bolts, items 2 and 4.

(1) AN4-10 - 50-70 maximum in.-lb.

(2) AN3-13 - 20-25 maximum in.-lb.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Approximately 2 man-hours will be required to carry out this inspection.



ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAMO/TM3

BRISTOL AIRCRAFT (WESTERN) LIMITED

C.A.F. MESSAGE OR

FROM: CANAIRMAT 51-00-260V

TO: MATLIST JULIETT ORIG. NO. LOGF188 DATE 1 FEB

Harley
Burns
Davidson
Eder
Feb

INFORMATION SPECIAL INSPECTION PD

A EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT EA 05-45B-5/121 PD

B OPERATING UNITS CMM RDS AND CONTRACTORS PD

C ON OR BEFORE NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION PD

D L14-1E AND L 14-5 PD

E NA

F NA

G TO ENSURE POWER LEADS PROPERLY DISCONNECTED AND STOWED FOLLOWING EMBODIMENT OF MOD NO 05-45B-6A/162 PD

H ON 3E AIRCRAFT ENSURE WIRES 949 AND 950 ARE DISCONNECTED AT TERMINAL C ON PORT AND STBD VOLTAGE REGULATOR BASES RESPECTIVELY PD ON 3N CMM AND 3TM AIRCRAFT ENSURE WIRES 949 AND 950 ARE DISCONNECTED AT CONDENSERS LOCATED IN PORT AND STBD GENERATOR CONTROL BOXES RESPECTIVELY PD STOW WIRES IAW EO 05-1-3/9 PD

J 15 MINUTES PD

K TERMINAL C IS BUSSED TO TERMINAL B ON VOLTAGE REGULATOR BASE PD ISSUED AS RESULT OF AIRCRAFT FIRE CAUSED BY IMPROPERLY DISCONNECTED CABLE PD

M XXXXX FIRST ISSUE

FORM BAW 2028-6-1 A

SPECIAL INSPECTION

DISCONNECTING AND STOWING OF POWER LEADS

(This EO replaces AMC Log F188 dated 1 Feb 63)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To ensure power leads were properly disconnected and stowed during embodiment of modification EO 05-45B-6A/162.

INSPECTION DATA

2 On 3T aircraft, ensure wires 949 and 950 are disconnected at terminal C on port and starboard voltage regulator bases respectively. On 3N, 3NM and 3TM aircraft, ensure wires 949 and 950 are disconnected at condensers located in port and starboard generator control boxes respectively. Stow wires per instructions in EO 05-1-3/9.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Terminal C is bussed to terminal B on the voltage regulator base. EO 05-45B-2, Part 11, Figures 11-8 and 11-9 will be amended to show modified wiring and correct configuration of voltage regulator base.

(b) This Special Inspection is raised as a result of an aircraft fire caused by improperly disconnected power lead.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SAVO/IES1

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
MAR 2 0 1963

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ELEVATOR CONTROL CABLES

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 2388 dated 25 Jun 62)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditors
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-6
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Commands to report all failures to AMC by message

PURPOSE

1 To inspect elevator control cables for deterioration and fraying beyond permissible limits.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Frayed cables inspected at the material laboratory revealed that the break down was caused by normal wear where the cable passes over the pulley Part AN210-3A at station 13.

(a) The following component parts are to be inspected - Ref. EO 05-45B-4 Part 2 Figure 66.

Part 187097 cable assembly elevator long	Item 28
Part 187096 cable assembly elevator short	Item 34
Part AN210-3A pulley	Item 28

(b) The inspection of these component parts is to be carried out in accordance with instructions contained in EO 05-45B-7A Section 1 group fuselage, item 20 and EO 05-1-3/10.

(c) Cables that have deteriorated beyond the specified limits are to be replaced.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The periodicity of inspections, method of inspection and the instructions outlining the permissible limits are considered adequate and no changes are contemplated to EO 05-45B-7A.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAMO/TT4

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
AUG 2 1962
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF RIGID TUBE ASSEMBLIES

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported to AMCHQ by message

PURPOSE

1 To determine if the flexible heater hose incorporated by modification EO 05-45B-6A/142 is chafing surrounding rigid tube assemblies and fittings along its entire length, particularly in the immediate area between the heat control valve connection and the supporting clamp AN742-D34. Reference EO 05-45B-4, Figure 73, items 47 and 52.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Refer to EO 05-45B-4.

(b) Inspect tube assemblies 644-189012-25, Figure 45, item 25, page 174 and 644-189692-62 Figure 79, item 20, page 306 for signs of chafing caused by heater hose 26JU00064003-1, item 44, page 286. If chafing is evident, replace worn or defective parts, ensuring that the flexible heater hose assembly is centrally located to clear all rigid tube assemblies. This may be accomplished by loosening clamp AN742-D34, then shorten or lengthen the hose as required, by sliding through the clamp. Re-tighten the clamp, and check to ensure that no further shifting is possible.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 1/2 man-hour will be required to carry out this inspection.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAMO/TT

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
JUN 22 1962
ACC.
ENG.
TOOL
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FIRE EXTINGUISHER INSTALLATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of Aircraft from storage and on completion of CAIR
RETURNS:	Not required by AMC

PURPOSE

1 Inspect fire extinguisher discharge cable installation.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Refer to EO 05-45B-4 Figure 72.

(b) By visual inspection ensure that the discharge cable is not binding and is attached to the fire extinguisher.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SACO/ACR

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
MAR 22 1962
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

AIRCRAFT FUEL NOZZLE GROUNDING SOCKETS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To inspect all fuel nozzle grounding sockets for corrosion, damage and resistance.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operation:

(a) Inspect all fuel nozzle grounding sockets visually for corrosion, damage or missing spring contact.

(b) Carry out bonding check of fuel nozzle grounding sockets by inserting a grounding plug Ref 4K/330 in the socket and check the resistance between the grounding plug and aircraft structure as per EO 40-90-10 Part 7 para 28.

(c) Damaged or unserviceable sockets are to be replaced.

NOTE

If replacement item is not immediately available, other grounding method or grounding point may be used as an interim measure.

(d) This inspection will be included in EO 05-45B-7A at the next revision.



ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SACO/ACA

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
MAR 3 0 1962
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

AILERON CONTROL STOP

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported to AMCHQ by message

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the knurled lock plate is installed on mainplane LH and RH.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Refer EO 05-45B-4 Part 2, Figures 3 and 62.

(b) Open mainplane rear inspection door, housing aileron bellcrank assembly.

(c) By visual inspection ascertain that the knurled lock plate Part 181787, located on inboard side of rib #7, between head of the stop-aileron control Part 18176 and the rib web, is installed. Subject plate is secured to rib by means of 4 rivets.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The part number of this particular lock plate is not listed in EO 05-45B-4. Amendment to follow in the next revision for information purposes only.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
AUG 25 1961

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FEATHERING SWITCHES

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/115 dated 6 Jul 61)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractor
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection due
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Yes
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported that screws securing bakelite body to metal casing on feathering switches Ref. 5CB/79 loosened allowing switch to separate.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:

(a) Inspect switches for security.

(b) On switches manufactured by General Electric ensure lockwashers are installed.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Approximately one man-hour will be required to carry out this inspection.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SAVO/IES2

SPECIAL INSPECTION

TAIL WHEEL LOCK CABLE - WEAR STRIP AT BULKHEAD 13

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditors - All
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractor
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not Required

PURPOSE

1 Instances have occurred of the tail wheel lock cable wearing into bulkhead 13. The fibre wear strip which is attached to bulkhead 13 has been found positioned too far aft to provide the necessary protection. This instruction is issued to inspect and to make the necessary adjustment to the fibre wear strip to prevent this unsatisfactory condition.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Through tail wheel well, locate tail wheel lock cable where it passes over wear strip on bulkhead 13.

(b) Where positive cases are found wear strip is to be relocated forward to a position where it will afford the necessary protection of its intended purpose.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 10 minutes to inspect and 1/2 man-hour if rectification required.

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Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

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OFFICE
AUG 11 1961
ACC.
ENG.
DISP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CLEARANCE OF WIRING & TERMINAL LUGS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than next Periodic Inspection due
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	10EA/35566 control panels in stock are to be inspected prior to installation
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To ensure sufficient clearance exists between the terminal lugs of the radio compass and MHF audio switches and the wiring from the white connector plug in the control panel (10EA/35566).

INSPECTION DATA

2 Proceed as follows:

(a) Inspect the wiring originating from the white connector plug on the control panel and ensure that sufficient clearance exists between the wiring and the terminal lugs on the co-pilots radio compass and MHF audio switches.

(b) If insufficient clearance exists, the following steps are to be taken.

(1) Remove and retain the four screws from the white connector plug and raise the connector and cable to provide access to the switches.

(2) Remove the solder and ground wire from connected terminal lugs of radio compass and MHF audio switches.

(3) Carefully bend the terminal lugs together.

(4) Replace ground wire by connecting to both terminals and re-solder ensuring no solder remains which would interfere with the wiring.

(5) Inspect the wiring and replace any spaghetti insulation and/or wires which have been frayed.

(6) Ensure switches are secure.

(7) Replace white connector plug using retained hardware.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) Approximately 1 man-hour will be required to accomplish this inspection.

(b) This Special Inspection is raised as a result of UCR 1225/All.

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ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/STelO/TelAF

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RUDDER TRIM LIGHT SOCKET PART 209 SHORTING ON HOUSING

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 1837 dated 11 May 61)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been found where terminals of lamp socket Part 209, refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 65, Item 31 has shorted against rudder trim indicator housing creating a potential fire hazard.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove panel and inspect lamp socket for possible short circuit.

(b) To remedy, insulate and position terminals to provide clearance of the trim indicator housing.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Approximately one man-hour will be required to carry out this inspection.

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Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
JUN 19 1961
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CO-PILOT'S RUDDER PEDAL L.H.

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Repair Depots and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Record Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Not Required
RETURNS:	Positive cases by routine message

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 To prevent fouling of the co-pilots LH rudder pedal on the engine fire extinguisher CO_2 bottle.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Ref. EO 05-45B-2, Part 2, Sect 6 on adjustment of toe brake pedals.

RESCINDED
AUTH .....

(a) Ensure correct rigging of brake pedals.

(b) Apply full left rudder and with co-pilots left brake full on; check the clearance between the pedal and the fire extinguisher CO_2 bottle.

(c) If interference exists a cut out of the rudder pedal is to be made similar to that illustrated in Figure 1. The dimensions are to be as required but not to exceed 30% of the pedal width or 60% of the length.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) The requirement of this special inspection was previously issued with an EO 05-45B-5A leaflet which changed the attitude of the rudder pedals to provide a more comfortable foot position during landing and taxiing requirements.

(b) Present EO 05-45B-2 include the specifications of the rudder pedals to this change. In a number of cases this change caused an interference to exist between the fire extinguisher CO_2 bottle and the co-pilots left rudder pedal.

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PROJECT ENGINEER

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

(c) Approximately 20 minutes are required per aircraft to accomplish this special inspection.

(d) This special inspection is issued as a result of 411 ASU UCR 0305/A7 dated 7 Nov 60.



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LINOIL SEEPAGE FROM MAINPLANE SPARS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before second Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Record Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases by routine message

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the mainplane front spar near the fitting that attaches to the center section truss for evidence of linoil seepage from the spar.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A vertical seam on both sides of the front spar fitting which attaches to the center section truss is sealed with soft solder. Refer to EO 05-45B-3 page 27 Figure 2-6. This area is to be inspected for evidence of linoil seepage. This inspection can be accomplished without any dismantling.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

RESCINDED

(a) The tubular structure of the wing front spar is corrosion proofed on the inside by slushing with linoil. This slushing is done after the assembly is complete, and the oil is allowed to drain from small holes which are later plugged with drive screws and from the two unwelded seams of the wing attachment fitting which are sealed with solder. Due to the many angles and joints in the structure, a considerable quantity of linoil may be trapped inside the tubes. In operation the drive screws and soldered seams may loosen up and allow the linoil to leak out. Such leaks are of course unimportant structurally and immediate corrective action is not warranted. Results of magnaflux of many hundreds of wing spars; which have had linoil seepage; have not revealed any cracks in the tubular structure or the hinge fitting.

(b) The aircraft design contractor recommends resealing of the spars at major overhaul only. Since the RCAF have no overhaul period the corrective period will be determined upon review of the positive case reports.

(c) The positive case reports are to indicate the following:-

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

All Exp. a/c

PROJECT ENGINEER

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

(1) Aircraft Serial No.

(2) Wing Serial No. and position.

(3) Total flying hours for the wing; if no record of change indicated, the assumption would be that of total airframe hours.

(d) Estimated time to accomplish this inspection is 10 minutes per aircraft.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BASE LANDING GEAR DOOR SWIVEL

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, Repair Depots, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before second Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage. Unit holdings of Part 26JU/804-185962
RETURNS:	Positive cases by routine message

PURPOSE

1 Incorrectly manufactured parts, 804-185962 base-landing gear door swivel, have resulted in two recent failures. This Special Inspection is issued to replace incorrectly manufactured parts found on the inspection.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Refer to EO 05-45B-4, page 40, Figure 8, Item 22, 804-185962 base landing gear door swivel.

(a) This inspection can be accomplished without removal of any parts.

(b) Inspect the exposed side of the base-landing gear door swivel and ensure that the relief radius between the flange and boss is .092" to .125".

(c) Parts found incorrectly manufactured are to be replaced.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) The designed relief radius between the boss and flange of the base-landing gear door swivel is .032" on the underside and .092" to .125" on the upperside. The parts involved in the failure had a radius of approximately .032" on both sides.

(b) Approximately 5 minutes per aircraft is required to carry out this inspection.

(c) This Special Inspection resulted from Bristol Aero Industries Ltd letter dated 19 May 60 and RCAF Stn Comox UCR 0520/A97 dated 31 May 60.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO All Expeditor a/c

PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FUEL GAUGE - TANK UNIT

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 2826, dated 15 Jul 60)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units Repair Depots
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the second Primary Inspection due
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for the condition of a potential fire hazard due to ingress of fuel into the fuel gauge-tank unit transmitter mechanism housing.

RESCINDED
AUTH .....

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:-

(a) Ref. EO 05-45B-2, Part 2, Figure 56, Item 26.

(b) Physically check the interior of the fuel gauge-tank units for ingress of fuel into the transmitter mechanism housing.

(c) In cases of positive evidence, remove the fuel-gauge-tank unit, ensure its serviceability and replace it in accordance with EO 05-45B-2, Part 5, Section 2.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Approximately 1 hour per aircraft is required to carry out the inspection.

(b) The ingress of fuel into the fuel gauge-tank unit housing may be attributed to:-

(1) Omission of sealing compound from the fuel gauge-tank unit gasket Part 189631. Reported instances cover this condition.

(2) Failure of the sealing mechanism of the fuel gauge tank unit.

(3) An unserviceable collar assembly fuel tank filler neck Part 189614 allowing overflow fuel to enter the fuel gauge-tank unit via the loosely fitted rubber grommet around the transmitting cable.

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO All Expeditor a/c
PROJECT ENGINEER

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

(c) Originating data for this special inspection 403 Sqn. Calgary UCR 0269/A13 dated 25 May 60, Training Command special inspection message AE3275 dated 14 Jun 60 and positive instances results, AE3318 dated 12 Jul 60.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

SCR274N ANTENNA INSTALLATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
SPARES IN STOCK AFFECTED:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required

PURPOSE

1 To prevent damage by the SI-100 or fouling of vertical stabilizers when a break occurs in the SCR274N antenna system.

INFORMATION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operation, see Figure 1:-

(a) The TUI-100 is to be anchored directly to the shackle on the stabilizer.

(b) The Anstat wire between TUI-100 and SI-100 must have a minimum length of 30".

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) It is estimated that approximately 1 man-hour will be required per aircraft to accomplish inspection and rectification.

(b) The effects this will have on the transmission and reception properties of the SCR274N are negligible.



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:-
AMC/S Tel O/Tel AF

Planning

EO 05-45B-5/104
Special Inspection

LOG1750 Date 21 Oct 1959

FROM: CANAIRMAT

A EXPEDITOR 3 AIRCRAFT EO 05-45B-5/104

B OPERATING UNITS

C BEFORE OR ON NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION

D L14-1B L14-5

E NA

F POSITIVE CASES BY UCR

G LOOSE OR INCORRECTLY POSITIONED PROPELLER FEATHERING SWITCHES CAN CAUSE ELECTRICAL CONTACT BETWEEN TERMINALS OF SWITCHES RESULTING IN FEATHERING BOTH PROPELLERS WHEN ONE SWITCH IS ACTUATED

H ENSURE FEATHERING SWITCHES ARE SECURELY MOUNTED AND HAVE POSITIONING PIN IN THE HOLE. INSPECT ELECTRICAL TERMINALS FOR TIGHTNESS AND REPLACE NON INSULATED TERMINALS WITH PRE INSULATED TYPE

J 30 MIN

K FOR ADC UNITS ADC 45B-5/1 REFERS

M FIRST ISSUE

RESCINDED

SPECIAL INSPECTION

PROPELLER FEATHERING SWITCHES

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 1750 dated 21 Oct 59)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Primary Inspection due.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive case to be reported by UCR.

PURPOSE

1 Loose or incorrectly positioned propeller feathering switches can cause electrical contact between the terminals of the switches. This can result in both propellers being feathered when either switch is actuated.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Disconnect aircraft batteries.

(b) Lower the instrument panel.

(c) Ensure feathering switches are securely mounted and that the positioning pin on the switch is in the hole in the mounting panel.

(d) Inspect electrical terminals for tightness and replace all non-insulated terminals with pre-insulated type.

(e) Secure instrument panel and reconnect aircraft batteries.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Approximately 1/2 man-hour is required to carry out this inspection.

(b) Originating data for this EO is Stn North Bay's OPS D14, 18 Sep 59, and positive cases reported on Air Defence Command's Special Inspection 45B-5/1.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FEATHERING PUMP MOTOR MOUNTING LUGS

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/98 dated 7 Jul 59)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Before installation on aircraft
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure good electrical contact between the motor body and mounting base, also between mounting base and airframe. Poor contact causes heating and arcing which is a potential fire hazard.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) Remove RH and LH propeller feathering motors.

(b) All paint and corrosion between the motor body and mounting base also between mounting base and airframe is to be removed.

(c) Re-install motor and install washers AN936A616 or AN936B616 under mounting bolt heads.

(d) If existing mounting bolts do not protrude through mounting base when washers are installed, they are to be replaced with bolt AN76A-5.

(e) Lockwire mounting bolts.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

(a) Para. 2 (b) is to be carried out each time the pump is replaced.

(b) Washers Sec./Ref. 28/AN936A616 and bolts 28/AN76A-5 are to be obtained from units stocks. If unavailable from this source, they are to be demanded from depot stocks by QU Message.

(c) EO 05-45B-2 will be amended to include this information.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACA

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FEATHERING SYSTEM LINE FAILURE PUMP TO FIREWALL

Replaced by 45B-6A/174

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 2872 dated 22 Sep 59)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED"	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before or not later than next Primary Inspection due
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Aircraft Maintenance Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Positive cases by Message to AMCHQ

PURPOSE

1 To prevent malfunction of the propeller feathering and unfeathering system and loss of engine oil.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Refer to EO 05-45B-4, page 174, item 17, tube assemblies pump to firewall, Parts 644-189087 and 404-189086 are to be removed and inspected for undercutting of the flares. Tube assemblies required to be replaced as a result of this Inspection are to be manufactured locally.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Practice feathering is not to be carried out until this Inspection is completed.

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THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
all Expeditor
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/101
7 Aug 59

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BULKHEAD THIRTEEN

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	Nil
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases by Message to AMCHQ

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 To examine the condition of bulkhead 13. This information is required to assist AMCHQ in the possible procurement of a Mod. Kit to additionally strengthen bulkhead 13.

INSPECTION DATA

2 To examine and report any instance of damage to bulkhead 13 and any repairs strengthening this area other than EO 05-45B-6A/75 dated 17 Apr 56.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

RESCINDED

A.C.A.S. .....

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO

All Exp. 3's

NDB Smith

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LOWER SLIDE TUBE CLUSTER, MAIN TRUSS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Aircraft Maintenance Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases by Message to AMCHQ

Restricted

PURPOSE

1 To determine if cracks exist in the tubes and welds in the area of the lower slide tube cluster of the main truss.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Refer to EO 05-45B-3, Part 2, page 25, Figure 2 "Lower Slide Tube Cluster". This joint is to be cleaned and visually examined for cracks in the tubes and welds in the vicinity of the cluster, paying particular attention to the area between tubes 7, 12 and 9.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

RESCINDED

AUTH .....

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
All Exp. 3's
NDB Wright
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACR

Planning

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/98
7 Jul 59

Replaced by
EO.05-45B-5/103

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FEATHERING PUMP MOTOR MOUNTING LUGS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure good electrical contact between the pump motor mounting lugs and the aircraft frame. Poor contact causes heating and arcing which is a potential fire hazard.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) Remove the RH and LH propeller feathering motors.

(b) All paint and corrosion on the bottom of the motor mounting lugs is to be removed.

(c) Replace motor and install washers 28/AN936A616 or 28/AN936B616 under mounting bolt heads.

(d) Lock wire mounting bolts.

RESCINDED

AUTH .....

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Para. 2(b) is to be carried out each time the pump is replaced.

(b) Washers 28/AN936A616 are to be obtained from unit stocks. If unavailable from this source they are to be demanded by QU Message.

(c) EO 05-45B-2 will be amended to include this information.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
CAIR PROGRAMME
NDB per [illegible]
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/97
28 Jan 59

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ANTI-ICER FLUID FLOW

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units: Not later than next Periodic Inspection, RDs and Contractors: Before issue.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 An evaluation of the Expeditor propeller anti-icing system has been carried out by CFS Trenton with the following results:-

(a) Actual consumption rates at both normal and maximum settings are considerably in excess of those quoted in EOs.

(b) Flow adjustment procedure as detailed presently in EO 05-45B-2 does not result in satisfactory adjustment of the system.

(c) Actual flow rate is not checked during periodic inspections; only at pump or rheostat change.

(d) After correct adjustment for "normal" flow the "maximum" rate of flow remains approximately double that stated in EO 05-45B-1. The purpose of this Special Inspection is therefore, to bring these discrepancies to the attention of operators and to check all aircraft to ensure correct rate of fluid flow.

RESCINDED

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection shall be carried out as follows:-

(a) Check anti-icer fluid flow at both propellers as follows:-

(1) Using a stop watch and two containers graduated in ounces, determine amount of fluid at "normal" in a 2-1/2 minute period; this should be between 5 to 6 ounces to give an hourly flow of 3 to 3.6 Imperial quarts/propeller/hour.

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO

All Sq. 3's

HDB [signature]
PROJECT ENGINEER

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

NOTE

EO 05-45B-1, Part 1, para.88, is in error and the flow given is in US quarts. Therefore the "normal" flow should be 3 Imp.quarts/propeller/hour and the "maximum" flow should be 4-1/2 or more Imp.quarts/propeller/hour.

(b) If flow is not in accord with above, adjust as outlined in EO 05-45B-2, Part 5, para.126 together with following additional information:-

(1) To decrease the fluid flow turn anti-icer check valves counterclockwise.

(2) Both sides must be adjusted together since adjustment of one side affects the flow of the other.

(3) Both check valves must be continually tapped lightly to simulate engine vibration and keep the valves free for the duration of ground testing.

(4) If the flow cannot be decreased to the correct rate with one or more check valves at the minimum setting, it is necessary to achieve an equal flow from each propeller and then make further adjustments by relocating the "normal" point on the rhéostat, i.e., moving "normal" point clockwise.

(5) The system is so susceptible to errors that to ensure correct calibration an air test is required. The system should be operated at "normal" setting for 20 minutes and a flow of 2 to 2.4 Imperial quarts obtained, i.e., 6 to 7.2 Imperial quarts/hour/both propellers.

(6) When measuring in the air, care must be taken not to fill the tank into the neck since the fluid will syphon out through tank vent and affect the measurements.

(7) When it is assured the correct "normal" setting has been obtained, check to determine the "maximum" flow. If the "maximum" flow diverges appreciably from the quantities indicated in EO 05-45B-1, the aircraft should be placarded, or the L14-1C annotated, indicating actual "maximum" flow and endurance.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) When no abnormal difficulties are encountered, this inspection, including necessary adjustments, requires four men one hour, and a 30 minute air test.

(b) An Advance Revision to EO 05-45B-2 will be issued correcting the description and adjustment instructions to include the information contained herein.

(c) AFHQ will be requested to issue a suitable amendment to EO 05-45B-1.

(d) Flow check every 200 hours will be included in the next revision to EO 05-45B-7A which is presently being prepared.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FAILURE OF PILOT'S SEAT ATTACHING BRACKET

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases by an "Info Only" Stats 318

PURPOSE

1 There have been recent cases of failure of the bracket which attaches 734-183297-7 (bracket - pilot's seat metal) to Part 804-183315 (leg assembly - pilot's seat front) EO 05-45B-4 dated Oct 57, page 390, Figure 98, Item 6 and 4 respectively. Failure of the port bracket can result in the seat canting into the elevator control column area causing restriction of the control column movement. Failure of the starboard bracket will overstress the remaining supports and may result in failure of other brackets.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A contributing factor to this failure is overtightening of bolts AN-6 (EO 05-45B-4 page 390 Figure 98, Item 7). Check the two bolts on both the pilots and co-pilots seats to make sure they are "finger tight". Inspect attaching bracket Part 734-183297-9 for cracks. If this bracket is found cracked, repair as outlined in EO 05-45B-3E dated 21 Feb 58.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMÇ/SACO/ACR

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
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OFFICE
FEB 26 1959
ACC.
ENG.
INSP.
PLANT

EO 05-45B-5/95
20 Jan 59

SPECIAL INSPECTION

GENERATOR FAILURE WARNING LIGHT RELAYS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Before installation
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that 12 volt relays are not installed in the generator failure warning light circuit

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:-

(a) Locate and remove generator failure warning light relay mounting box and inspect relay for correct voltage rating.

(b) Relays found with 12 volt coils are to be removed and replaced with 24 volt relays Par 1252-24, Ref. 5CB/10147.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA



ENGINEERING
OFFICE
FEB 18 1959
ACC.
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INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION
REPAIR LINKS OF AILERON CONTROL COLUMN CABLE

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 2802 dated 30 Dec 58)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L-14, Aircraft Maintenance Record Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of Aircraft from Storage
RETURNS:	Positive cases by routine Message

PURPOSE

1 Inspection of repair links of aileron control column LH and RH cable assembly to prevent loss of aileron control.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Refer to EO 05-45B-4, page 236, Figure 61. Check cable assembly aileron control column both LH and RH to ensure that Part 1882 cover plate (DI) Figure 61, Item 43, is installed. If the cover plate is found missing, the complete repair link is to be replaced.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING
OFFICE
FEB 12 1959

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RADIO JUNCTION BOX 3MBA-4803

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3T Aircraft only
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported that the hole drilled for phone jacks JK34 as per EO 05-45B-6A/95, is too near the cabling in the radio junction box. As a consequence, the phone plug may rub against wire R93, causing the insulation to fray down.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Radio junction box 3MBA-4803 is to be inspected, to ensure that this condition does not exist.

(b) Take corrective action if required.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/S Tel O/Tel AF

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
DEC 2 1958
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INSP.
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

DELETION OF ADJUSTING NUT TORQUE VALUE STAMPED ON BRAKE CYLINDER HEAD

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/92 dated 20 Oct 58)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Brake Assembly 27A/3134 Part 530886SG
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Prior to installation
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that no confusion will exist regarding the proper torque value of nut, adjusting pin 27A/3103 Part 9510894.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) By visual inspection ascertain if any torque value for nut adjusting pin is stamped on brake cylinder head, 27A/3135 Part 9521603.

(b) If the adjusting pin nut torque value is stamped on cylinder head, it is to be obliterated.

NOTE

Do not obliterate "Torque Head 75 lb ft".

(1) With a 1/4" steel stamp letter X, cover each letter and numeral of adjusting pin nut torque value only, making certain blow struck is only sufficient to leave no clear trace of nut torque value.

(2) Anti-corrosive treatment in accordance with applicable directives.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Cross refer this inspection to EO 15-45B/530886SG-5/1.

(b) Refer to EO 15-45B/530886SG-2 for applicable torque values.

(c) If the above instruction carried out under previous leaflet, no further action required.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA



SPECIAL INSPECTION

WING FLAP FIRE HAZARD

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/83 dated 22 Nov 57)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractor's
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To obviate wing flap igniting from reflected sun's rays.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Since issuance of EO 05-45B-5/83 a further case has occurred of the sun being reflecte off the fuselage skin panel and focalizing on the wing flap resulting in smoldering fabric which but for early detection, would have resulted in a serious fire. In an effort to more positivel assure this condition will not be repeated units are to paint the area between seven and eigh bulkheads below the escape hatch on the RH side and an equivalent height on the LH side, wit aluminized lacquer to Spec MIL-L-7178, RCAF Ref. 33A/424.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR


STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
NOV 12 1958
ACC.
ENG.
TOOL
PLANT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LANDING GEAR CHAIN LOCK NUTS

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 2813 dated 15 Sep 58)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs or Contractor
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Primary Inspection RDs or Contractor - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not Required

ACTN

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported of main landing gear retract chain tension adjusting jam nuts working loose. This could cause chain slackening with possibility of chain failure. This Special Inspection checks chain for correct tension and replaces the existing check nut with a self-locking nut.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 22, Index 71 and EO 05-45B-2, Part 2, Section 8, para 19. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Check main landing gear retract chains for correct tension.

(b) Remove AN316-65 nut check (the Part List is in error here, the number should read AN316-6R) from the eye-bolts and replace with AN364-624C nut self-locking.

NOTE

In some cases it may be found that the substitution of a thick self-locking nut for the thinner check nut will not permit the normal one-thread protrusion through the nut to ensure safety; in these cases it is permissible to remove both the plain nut and the check nut and use only the self-locking nut.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 If AN364-624C self-locking nuts are not immediately available from unit stocks, the existing check nuts are to be inspected for looseness every Primary Inspection until the substitution can be made.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
all Esq 3
MDB
PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/89
29 Aug 58

SPECIAL INSPECTION

UNDERCARRIAGE DOWN LIMIT SWITCHES

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required by AMC

PURPOSE

1 To tighten loose terminal screws in the undercarriage down limit switches.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove switch box cover.

(b) Ensure terminal screws are tight.

(c) Re-install switch box cover.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This inspection is a result of TAC letter 093-4(STSO) dated 13 Aug 58.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/86
10 Apr 58

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BRAKE HOSE LINE CHAFING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection or equivalent
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMC

PURPOSE

1 To detect and correct chafing of the brake hose assemblies.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A recent survey of 14 Training Group Expeditor aircraft has revealed that the majority show signs of the brake hose lines chafing against the nacelle structure former when the landing gear is in the retracted position. Refer to Figure 1. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Inspect the pilot and co-pilot brake hose assemblies for signs of chafing where contact may be made with the nacelle structure former.

(b) Severely chafed assemblies to be replaced.

(c) Whether chafing is evident or not take following corrective action:

(1) With leg fully extended pull hose lines over to shoulder of wheel fork and clamp as shown in Figure 2 using a cushion of rubber tape around the hose and wraplock, RCAF Ref 29/1743.

(d) Repeat on opposite landing gear.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Since the brake hose lines are detailed for inspection in both EO 05-45B-7 and -7A no further amendment action is considered necessary.

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ / ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1



Figure 2

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD
ENGINEERING OFFICE
APR 7 1958

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CORRECTION TO GYROSYN COMPASS WIRING

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/70 dated 15 Aug 56)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-6
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 On conversion of 3MN Expeditors to Model 3TM, the gyrosyn compass wiring has been found to be incorrect resulting in the grounding of the shielded wires and also the signal from the flux valve synchro rotor, thereby causing malfunction of the compass system. Refer EO 05-45B-2 dated 15 May 53, Figure 10-31, page 213 for correct wiring.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection will be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove wire F1019-18 from terminal #1 in the navigation instrument junction box and tape back the free end.

(b) Connect jumper wire (#20 size) from #1 pin on the C2 gyrosyn compass indicator to the shielding of wire #1020.

(c) Connect the shielding of wires #1020 and #1017 together at the system junction box Part 644-180545.

(d) Connect the shielding of wire #1017 to pin G of the gyrosyn amplifier Part 66-4256.

(e) To test circuit, remove the compass amplifier AN connector and with the connectors of all other compass components properly connected there should be NO continuity between pin G (shielded network) of the amplifier AN connector and the airframe.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This inspection cross refers to UCR 7913/A5097 and CPA(R) EO 970.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

EO 05-45B-5/84
29 Nov 57

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
RELAY BOX
GENERATOR WARNING LIGHT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required by AMC.

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported that the relay mounting box Part 21798 installed as per EO 05-45B-6A/66 may have water in it.

RESCINDED

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Relay box Part 21798 is to be inspected, to ensure this condition does not exist.

(b) Relay box to be drilled .1875 at each aft corner.

(c) Slack in wire to cannon plug to be formed in drip loop.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. [illegible] APPLICABLE TO

all a/c

H.K. for FH
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

REGISTERED JAN 20 1958 BRISTOL AEROPLANE (WESTBURY) LTD ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

5791

SPECIAL INSPECTION

WING FLAP FIRE HAZARD

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases by info STATS 318

REGISTERED ACTM

PURPOSE

1 To detect and rectify a condition that could lead to wing flap igniting and subsequent complete loss of aircraft by fire.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A case has occurred of the sun being reflected off a fuselage skin panel and focalizing on the wing flap. The fabric ignited and only prompt use of a fire extinguisher prevented the loss of an aircraft. A second case has now been reported where an aircraft arriving at the repair depot for a fly-in repair was found to have patches in the same general flap area where focalizing occurred as above. Upon patch removal the fabric was found badly scorched. It would appear that whoever found the flap scorched, repaired it without determining how such scorching occurred. A special inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Inspect the upper surfaces of the wing flaps for evidence of scorching in the area near the fuselage.

(b) If scorching evident, check fuselage skin panels for a dished or concave condition that might reflect and focus the sun rays in such a manner as to cause the scorch.

(c) Remedy the concave condition by use of a diagonal stiffener rivetted to skin interior of affected panel.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO all a/c

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

RECEIVED
OCT 03 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WEST...)
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

RESTRICTED
EO 05-45B-5/82
12 Sep 57

SPECIAL INSPECTION

EXTENSION LINK BOLT SHEARING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic or equivalent
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required

Rescinded

RESTRICTED
ACTN

PURPOSE

1 To reveal undetected wear on the bolts attaching the pilot and co-pilot's extension links to the rudder pedal supports.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A case has been reported of the AN23-23 bolt attaching the co-pilot's LH extension link to the rudder pedal support assembly shearing. Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 31, Index 13 for bolt location. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Locate and remove the two AN23-18 bolts attaching the pilot's extension links to the pedal supports, the AN23-21 bolt attaching the co-pilot's RH link, and the AN23-23 bolt attaching the co-pilot's LH link.

(b) Inspect removed bolts for distortion and wear.

(c) Re-assemble using serviceable bolts and ensure nuts correctly safetied.

(d) Check rudder controls per EO 05-1-2T.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS / IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
All Aircraft.
A/C Not already
Bagged or Subs
H.K. 3/10/57
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

RECEIVED AUG 19 1957 BRISTOL AIRCRAFT (WESTERN) LIMITED

SPECIAL INSPECTION
WING SKIN WEAR

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM aircraft.
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating units, Repair Depots, and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic or equivalent
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required

PURPOSE:

1 To reveal wear of the lower wing skin where the nacelle fillet fairing makes contact.

INSPECTION DATA:

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate and remove the nacelle nose outboard fillet Part 404-181010 L and R (refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 2, index 10, 11).

(b) Inspect lower wing skin and de-icer boot strip, where the fillet makes contact for wear. Refer to Figure 1 for illustration of severe case and Figure 2 for area location.

(c) If wear evident inspect the rubber strip Part 404-181000-2, to determine why it has not been functioning to prevent such wear. In some aircraft undergoing CAIR this strip has been found missing and in others mislocated.

(d) Where only light wear evident treat for corrosion resistance per EO 05-1-3, Part 23, para 21. In cases where wear has penetrated to more than 30% of the skin thickness a repair will be required. Figure 3 illustrates a typical repair and dimensions will depend on circumstances.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 The maintenance schedule EO 05-45B-7A will be amended to call for inspection of the rubber strip Part 404-181000-2 for condition and location and wing skin where fillet contacts for wear, every 100 hours.

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all aircraft in plant
HK 19 Aug 57
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3

Prepared By:-
AMC/SACO/ACR

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF .

SPECIAL INSPECTION

COWLING WRAPPER SHEET WEAR

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T or 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs or Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic or equivalent
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required

PURPOSE

1 To detect and arrest wear on the engine cowling wrapper sheets where the carburettor shield may be chafing.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove the Part 18S5850P wrapper sheet assemblies and inspect for wear resulting from chafing against the Part 774-185919 carburettor shield, refer to Figure 1.

(b) When wear is apparent, remove the rubber seal from the shield and trim shield as required to prevent further chafing. Removal of 1/4" should suffice.

(c) Replace rubber seal.

(d) Repair wrapper sheet if degree of wear warrants.

(e) Repeat on opposite engine.

STANDARD AERO ENGINE LTD.
ENGINEERING OFFICE
SEP 3 1957

Figure 1

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

RECEIVED
JUN 21 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/79
29 May 57

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FEATHERING SWITCHES

(This EO replaces AMC Message Log 2320 dated 15 May 57)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor Aircraft - Feathering Switches Arrow H&H39116
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 Maintenance Record Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Before Installation
RETURNS:	Positive Cases by Message

PURPOSE

1 To prevent inadvertent propeller feathering caused by sliding contact assembly screw working loose, bending the leaf contacts and producing an intermittent short which operated the feathering motor.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operation:-

(a) Locate feathering switches in cockpit and check manufacturers type and name on the body of the switch. No further action required if other than Arrow H&H39116.

(b) Remove cover of switch Part Arrow H&H39116 and examine leaf contact springs. Reject switch if leaf contacts are damaged or bent.

(c) Remove centre screw securing sliding contact assembly to switch shaft; dip threads in glyptol cement and re-install. Replace cover and check for correct operation.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:-

(a) Feathering switches General Electric Part 2CC1B4 and Hart Part 569B24 have a rivetted contact assembly instead of a screw and do not require paragraph 2 (b) and subsequent to be carried out.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

PROJECT ENGINEER

RECEIVED
MAY 30 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

OIL TANK INLET HOSE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units, RDs, Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Next Periodic Inspection, or equivalent.

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14-1B, L14-5

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: NA

RETURNS: Information UCRs on positive cases with suggestions for improvement of the situation, see paragraph 3.

PURPOSE

1 To reveal cases of oil tank inlet hose connections loose and hose perished.

INSPECTION DATA

2 One unit reports that of thirteen aircraft inspected, four were found with loose clamps on the hose Part 106200-H-16-12, refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 60, Index 26, and two found with hose deteriorated to the point where replacement was necessary. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove oil tank cover panel and the oil dilution valve inspection panel.

(b) With access through the tank bay lightening holes and the inspection panel ensure hoses are properly positioned, clamps tightened and the hose condition is fit enough to remain serviceable until the next #4 Check.

(c) Repeat on opposite nacelle.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The subject hose assemblies are in a difficult area to readily inspect and service. It is probably for this reason the above inspection has been found necessary. The tank panels are only removed on #4 Checks at the present time and it is considered this is sufficiently often to maintain the area if a thorough check is carried out. A thorough check in this instance can only be interpreted as a comprehensive and searching inspection of the entire area normally hidden by the cover and not just for serviceability but a sufficiently high degree of fitness that in the judgment of the technician no risk of failure for a further 400 hours is evident. Present day hose clamps will not normally back off if adequately tensioned and hose deterioration is a progressive process that can be detected before the danger point if proper detection methods are used. In this case it would probably be difficult, if not impossible, to detect deterioration of the braided MIL-H-6000 hose short of complete removal from the aircraft. In view of the several recent

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
all aircraft in Plant.
H.K. 29/5/57
PROJECT ENGINEER

ADDITIONAL DATA (Cont'd)

cases of hose deterioration in various places where accessibility is difficult it appears that the safest course AMC can take is to put a "life" on all rubber hose. Since this will result inevitably in a substantially increased unit work load AMC is reluctant to take such a step if a more satisfactory one exists. User units are invited to include practical suggestions for a solution to this problem in their UCRs reporting positive cases.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/77
3 May 57

RECEIVED
MAY 30 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ENGINE CONTROLS IN PEDESTAL

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/71 dated 12 Dec 56 and AMC LOG dated 9 Apr 57)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3MN, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Primary or next Periodic Check, see paragraph 2 for clarification
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Where control failure or incipient failure found cases to be reported via UCR

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 The purpose is twofold:-

(a) To ensure the clevis bolt connecting control levers to engine controls is of the correct type and is properly safety wired.

(b) To inspect the engine controls in the area within the control pedestal for certain unsatisfactory conditions outlined hereunder that might lead to control failure if undetected.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This Special Inspection contains the data previously issued under EO 05-45B-5/71 dated 12 Dec 56 in paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c). If 5/71 has previously been carried out, the aforementioned paragraphs may be by-passed and the remainder of the inspection data carried out not later than the next primary inspection; if not, the following data is applicable and is to be carried out not later than the next periodic:-

(a) Remove clevis bolts, item 97, Figure 55, EO 05-45B-4, and ensure it is of the proper description and that no threads come in contact with the control lever. If replacement is necessary and stocks are not readily available, the bolt may be locally manufactured from AN73-11 or longer bolt to dimensions shown in Figure 1.

(b) Replace and tighten clevis bolt ensuring it is not overtorqued to extent sides of clevis are binding on the control lever. Safety wire (EO 05-1-2AQ), using .051 annealed brass wire, as shown in Figure 2, ensuring wire is wrapped twice around the control BELOW the jam nut.

(c) This inspection applies to throttle, mixture, propeller, manifold heat and oil shutter controls.

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
All aircraft
in Plant
HK 29/5/57
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1



Figure 2


CONTROL LEVER
INSPECT A
CONTROL PEDESTAL
SUPPORT BRACKET
INSPECT B
CLEVIS
INSPECT C
INSPECT D
INSPECT E
PHENOLIC CLAMP

Figure 3

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(d) This portion of the inspection arises from two incidents of throttle control failure, one a point "C" and another at point "D", refer to Figure 3. The cause of failure at point "C" was no readily apparent, however, one of the support brackets at point "A" was broken at the lowe attachment point and possibly permitted side play which could have contributed to the failures The cause of failure at point "D" was attributed to a too small clearance between the phenolic clamp and rigid end of the control thereby not providing for small deflection from rotational trave of control lever. Also, it has been reported that overtorquing Part 189063 clevis bolt is easily done and difficult to detect and may result in failures similar to those described above. Proceed as follows, referring to Figure 3:-

(1) Ensure clevis bolt is not overtorqued to an extent that S-197 clevis binds the throttle, mixture or propeller control lever ends.

(2) Inspect support brackets "A" for cracks or fracture. Defective brackets to be locally repaired or manufactured since no spares exist.

(3) Inspect threaded end of control "C" immediately below jam nut for condition.

(4) Inspect rigid portion of outer housing "D" for bending or evidence of fracture.

(5) Ensure flexible portion "E" of control protrudes at least 3/8" above phenolic clamp.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 A modification substituting a clevis pin for the 189063 clevis bolt is being investigated.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

Planning

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/7
1 May 57

SPECIAL INSPECTION

PRIMER LINE CHAFING PARKING BRAKE CONTROL

(This EO replaces AMC Log 3325 dated 25 Mar 57)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating units, Repair depots and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMC

Rescinded

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To revise and correct cases of fuel primer line chafing against the parking brake assembly.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Cases have been reported of chafing of the Part 404-189660 tube assembly-engine primer pedestal, where the Part 404-187905 control assembly-parking brake has been routed between the primer line and wall of the pedestal. A check of Training Command aircraft reveals no chafing where the parking brake control is routed between the primer line and fuel selector actuating rod or where routed inboard of actuating rod. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Check run of parking brake control assembly for chafing on adjacent fuel lines or other lines or structure.

(b) Where chafing or risk of chafing evident rectify ensuring routing is as found acceptable and outlined above.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Like EO 05-45B-5/73 positive cases will indicate the need for some operators to pay closer attention to periodic inspections of lines and controls.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
all aircraft in plant
H.K. 29/5/57

RECEIVED
APR 1, 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT (WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BRAKE BALANCE CABLES FRAYING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units, RDs and Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Units - Next Periodic Inspection
RDs and Contractors - before issue

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14-1B and L14-5

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: NA

RETURNS: None required

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the pilot's and co-pilot's brake balance cables for fraying beyond permissible limits.

INSPECTION DATA

2 An operating unit has reported four of its six aircraft have been found with the brake balance cables frayed beyond permissible limits. No reason can be given for the failures other than undetected fair wear and tear over a prolonged period. Failure of either of the brake balance cables although undesireable, is not likely to affect airworthiness since they are primarily for absorbtion of rudder pedal forces during application of brakes. The inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove belly access panel and locate the pilot's and co-pilot's brake balance cable assemblies Part 404-187887. Refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 31, Index 33.

(b) Inspect the cables throughout their run, particularly where they bear on the Part AN210-3A pulleys, for fraying beyond the permissible limits detailed in EO 05-1-3, Part 10.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 The maintenance schedule, EO 05-45B-7A, Part 1, Item FU205, will be amended to specifically mention inspection of these cables.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. 15 APPLICABLE TO
All A/c in fleet
included in CAIR.
Handbook Item 1959
HK 2 April 57.
ENGINEER

RECEIVED
MAR 1 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT (1953) LIMITED
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ELEVATOR CONTROL ARM FOR CRACKING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units, RDs, Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units - Next Periodic Inspection
RDs and Contractors - Before Issue

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14-1, L14-5

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: NA

RETURNS: Not required by AMC.

RESCINDED
ACTN ....

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the Part 804-187504 elevator arm assembly for cracks.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection arises from a case found during CAIR and a subsequent one during inspection of Station Winnipeg aircraft. It is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Gaining access through the large belly inspection panel locate the subject control arm referring to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 62, Index 14.

(b) Clean and visually inspect the arm assembly for cracks particularly the area of edge distance outward from the taper pin holes. Refer to Figure 1.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This type of failure is attributed to faulty taper pin installation such as improper taper reaming and/or overtorquing taper-pin nut. Technicians should be made aware of the necessity for proper installation techniques.

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
MAR 4 1957
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

RECEIVED
MAR 1 1957
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/73
5 Feb 57

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF OIL DILUTION FUEL LINE

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/16 dated 19 Feb 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection or Equivalent
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK	NA
RETURNS:	None Required

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for and rectify if necessary, chafing of oil dilution fuel lines Parts 84-189743, 644-189748 and 644-189749. Refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 60, Index 41.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate the subject oil dilution lines where they run from the firewall up to the oil dilution solenoid and back down to the "Y" drain.

(b) Carefully inspect the lines for condition and evidence of chafing against the prop anti-icer lines, fire detection wires, or firewall stringers.

(c) Where chafing or risk of chafing evident tubing to be so supported by use of clips or stand-off clamps as to eliminate the condition, replacing defective lines where necessary.

(d) Repeat in opposite nacelle.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Although this has been the subject of a previous Special Inspection and is felt to be adequately covered in the maintenance schedule, cases are periodically reported of lines being chafed completely through prior to detection. For obvious reasons operators must make a special point of inspecting every inch of fuel lines at intervals not greater than 400 hours and all accessible lines at the lesser periods outlined in the maintenance schedule.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

MAR 4 1957

PROJECT ENGINEER

CRESTEL AIRCRAFT (WESTERN) LIMITED
WINNIPEG CANADA

ENGINEERING MEMORANDUM

TITLE: Effectivity Clarification EO 05-45B-5/72

E.M. NO.: 20404

EFFECTIVE: Immediately

DWG. NO.:

PART NO.:

PART NAME: Cracked Primer Line Sleeve

JOB NO.: CATR

CUSTOMER'S ORDER NO.:

CUSTOMER: RCAF

TYPE AIRCRAFT: Expeditor 3

AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION NO.:

DATE: 5 June 57

DWG. CHANGE: YES / NO

USE OF E.M.: SALVAGE / CONDENSION / STOP ORDER/RELEASE / NEW DRAWING / REVISED DRAWING / VARIATION / OBSOLETE NOTICE / USE AS NOTED ✓

DISPOSITION OF STOCK: CHECK BLOCKS AFFECTED / NOT AFFECTED / USE TO DEPLETION / REWORK / SCRAP / AS NOTED / PARTS COMPLETED / PARTS IN PROCESS / TOOLING / RAW MATL. / INTERCHANGEABILITY AFFECTED (YES / NO) / STRENGTH AFFECTED (YES / NO)

ORIGINATED BY: H. Nephanson, B. A. W. PROJ. ENG.

B. A. W. INSPECTION

APPROVALS: ENGINEERING / CONTRACTS ADMIN. / CUSTOMER

GIVE F.M. PARTICULARS AND SKETCH WHERE POSSIBLE

When EO 05-45B-6A/107 Firewall Primer Flex Line is incorporated, EO 05-45B-5/72 does not apply.

Therefore, effective on a/c 1556 EO 05-45B-5/72 is to be regarded as rescinded.

RESCINDED

RUN-JUNE-7-1957

NOTE: WHEN EFFECTIVITY IS OMITTED FROM E.M. CHANGES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE UPON PLANNING DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION

SHEET 1 OF 1

FEB 1 1957

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/72
18 Jan 57

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CRACKING PRIMER LINE SLEEVES

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 3348 19 Dec 56)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Repair Depots, and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Primary Inspection - RDs and Contractors - before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported of cracked sleeves in Part 644-189753, primer intake tube assembly. Fuel leakage creates a fire hazard. Cracking is probably due to overstressing sleeve by overtorquing nut to elbow with vibration a possible contributing factor.

RESCINDED

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate Part 644-189753 tube assembly; refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 59, index 67.

(b) Remove tube assembly and visually inspect both sleeves for cracks.

(c) Replace serviceable assemblies torquing to 40-65 inch-pounds.

(d) Where sleeves found cracked, fabricate new assemblies referring to EO 05-45B-4, Par 4, page 326.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 A modification substituting a flexible hose for the subject tube is under consideration Operators are urged to ensure that maintenance personnel are aware of torque limits for hos and tube assemblies as outlined in EO 05-1-3, Part 25.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
a/c
PROJECT ENGINEER

Information: EO 05-45B-5/77 B.A.N. INSPECTION TO NOTE

LOG3339 Orig. No.	9 APR 57 Date

SUPERSEDES 05-45B-5/71 AND ACTION PARA J. C.J. BOACH 11 APR 57.

SPECIAL INSPECTION EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT

A FOR AIRCRAFT HAVING EO 05-45B-5/71 COMPLETED CARRY OUT NOT LATER THAN NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION PD FOR AIRCRAFT NOT YET HAVING 5/71 COMPLETED CARRY OUT NOT LATER THAN NEXT PERIODIC PD.

B ALL EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT EO 05-45B-5/77

C OPERATORS REPAIR DEPOTS AND CONTRACTORS

D SINCE PREPARATION OF EO 05-45B-5/71 THROUGH PRIOR TO ITS BEING CARRIED OUT CXM TWO INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED OF THROTTLE CONTROL FRACTURING INSIDE PEDESTAL PD FIRST INCIDENT INVOLVING EXPEDITOR ON LOAN TO RCN CONSISTED OF RIGID SLIDE CASE FAILING WHERE THREADED INTO FITTING AT END OF FLEXIBLE PORTION JUST ABOVE PHENOLIC BLOCK WHICH ANCHORS CONTROL TO PEDESTAL PD THIS ATTRIBUTED TO INSUFFICIENT DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PHENOLIC CLAMP AND RIGID END OF CONTROL THEREBY NOT PROVIDING FOR SMALL DEFLECTION FROM ROTATI/ ONAL TRAVEL OF CONTROL LEVER PD FOLLOWING FAILURE ONLY PARTIAL CONTROL AVAILABLE PD SECOND INCIDENT OCCURRED STN GREENWOOD WHEN THREADED END OF CABLE FRACTURED IMMEDIATELY BELOW THE PART S-197 CLEVIS WHICH LINKS THE CONTROL TO THROTTLE LEVER PD COMPLETE LOSS OF THROTTLE CONTROL RESULTED PD CAUSE OF FAILURE NOT EVIDENT THOUGH FURTHER INSPECTION REVEALED THAT AN ANGLE BRACKET BEARING PART NUMBER 183883L PAREN NOT LISTED IN EO 05-45B-4 PAREN WAS BROKEN AT LOWER ATTACHMENT END PD THIS BRACKET IS ONE OF TWO WHICH SUPPORTS THROTTLE LEVER PIVOT SHAFT AND APPARENTLY ALSO FORMS PART OF THROTTLE FRICTION LOCK PD CONSIDERED POSSIBLE SIDE PLAY PERMITTED BY BRACKET FAILURE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED

Blanning

RESCINDED

Information:

LOG3339 Orig. No.	9 APR Date

TO CONTROL FAILURE PD ALSO ONE OPERATOR REPORTS THAT DURING EO 05-45B-5/71 OVER TORQUING PART 189063 CLEVIS BOLT IS EASILY DONE AND DIFFICULT TO DETECT AND WILL RESULT IN FRACTURE SIMILAR TO SECOND CASE MENTIONED ABOVE PD SINCE ALL THE ABOVE PROBLEMS ARE SO CLOSELY RELATED EO 05-45B-5/71 IS CANCELLED AND SUPERSEDED BY THIS SPECIAL INSPECTION PD

E AIRCRAFT HAVING 5/71 ALREADY CARRIED OUT WILL REQUIRE ONLY THE FOLLOWING INSPECTION CMM ALL OTHERS REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING TOGETHER WITH THE DATA CONTAINED IN 5/71 PD

1 ENSURE CLEVIS BOLT PART 189063 NOT OVER TORQUED TO EXTENT CLEVIS PART S-197 BINDS THE THROTTLE CMM MIXTURE OR PROPELLER CONTROL LEVER ENDS PD

2 INSPECT PART 183883 ANGLE BRACKETS MENTIONED ABOVE FOR CRACKS OR FRACTURE PD DEFECTIVE BRACKETS TO BE LOCALLY REPAIRED OR MANUFACTURED SINCE NO XXXX SPARES EXIST PD

3 INSPECT THREADED END OF CONTROL IN AREA WHERE IT ENTERS CLEVIS FOR CONDITION PD ALSO RIGI PORTION OF OUTER HOUSING ABOVE PHENOLIC LAMP FOR CONDITION PD

4 ENSURE FLEXIBLE PORTION OF CONTROL PROTRUDES AT LEAST THREE EIGHTHS INCH ABOVE PHENOLIC CLAMP

F TWO MEN 30 MAN MINUTES IF EO 05-45B-5/71 PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT CMM FOUR MAN HOURS IF NOT P

G A MODIFICATION SUBSTITUTING A CLEVIS PIN FOR THE 189063 CLEVIS BOLT IS BEING INVESTIGATED PI

H MA

J POSITIVE CASES TO AMC BY UCR

K CANCELS AND REPLACES EO 05-45B-5/71

RECEIVED
SEP 27 1956
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION
CORRECTION TO GYROSYN COMPASS WIRING

Replaced by 45B-5/85

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	On or before the next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B, L14-6
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

CANCELLED
DATE

PURPOSE

1 On conversion of 3MN Expeditors to Model 3TM, the gyrosyn compass wiring has been found to be incorrect resulting in the grounding of the shielded wires and also the signal from the flux valve synchro rotor, thereby causing malfunction of the compass system. Refer EO 05-45B-2 dated 15 May 53, Figure 10-31, page 213 for correct wiring.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection will be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove wire F1019-18 from terminal #1 in the navigation instrument junction box and tape back the free end.

(b) To test circuit remove the compass amplifier AN connector and with the connectors of all other compass components properly connected, there should be NO continuity between pin G (shielded network) of the amplifier AN connector and the airframe.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This inspection cross refers to UCR 6212/A9 from 111 C & R Flight, Station Winnipeg.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ / ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all 3TM a/c
CONVERTED FROM 3NM
H.K. Sept/56
PROJECT ENGINEER

P Planning

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/69
15 Jun 56

SPECIAL INSPECTION

DETERIORATION OF FLAP RIB STITCHING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1 and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not Required

Cancelled
RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the flap rib stitching of the inboard ribs is not deteriorating and breaking at the point where the under side fabric is attached. Where stitching broken to also check for deteriorated fabric where contacting the ribs.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Inspect the flap interior for broken rib stitching at the under side of the visible inboard ribs; visual access to be gained by cutting out the fabric from the root rib lightening hole.

(b) Where stitching found broken the flap is to be removed and fabric stripped for a distance from the inboard end sufficient to ensure unserviceable fabric and stitching is removed.

(c) Carry out local repairs, where feasible, in accordance with EO 05-45B-3, Part 7, ensuring cellulose tape is used to cover all sharp edges and drainage grommets are fitted to the aft inner corners on the underside of all panels.

NOTE

Insufficient quantities of serviceable flaps are presently in stock to support the wholesale replacement of all flaps that might be in need of repair. For this reason local repair in all but the most severe cases will be necessary until the aircraft is phased through CAIR.

(d) Flaps not requiring attention per para (c) to have patch placed over cut-out used for visual inspection.

RECEIVED
AUG 15 1956
PRODUCTION PLANNING

THIS EO IS APPLICABLE
ALL AIRCRAFT
(SEE EM 20191
H K 10/8/56
PROJECT ENGINEER

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The following additional data applies:

(a) The aircraft maintenance schedule EO 05-45B-7A is to be locally amended to include this inspection each #4 check. Formal amendments will be submitted during the next revision period.

(b) The overhaul contractor will be approached to fit inspection windows or panels during components overhaul. Also to investigate using self-tapping metal screws to hold the fabric (similar to Harvard Components) in lieu of rib stitching.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/68
5 Apr 56

RECEIVED
JUN 25 1956
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL INSPECTION

PROPELLER CONTROL ADJUSTING BOLT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units: Next Periodic Inspection RDs & Contractors: Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1, L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required by AMC.

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 The propeller control adjusting bolt Part 4-189036, is subjected to considerable wear from vibration and the wear is apparently going undetected during normal inspection, see Figure 1.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate the bolt - adjusting Part 4-189036. Refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure ~~48~~ 47, index 11.

(b) Remove bolt and inspect for excessive wear. Where excessive wear is found a serviceable bolt is to be used for replacement.

(c) Replace bolt and adjust propeller governor control as outlined in EO 05-45B-2, Part 5, paragraph 40.

(d) Repeat on opposite engine.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This inspection will be included in the next revision of EO 05-45B-7A, to be carried out every #4 check.

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO all 'B' crash and C.A.I.R. a/c
NK 25-6-56
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

RECEIVED
MAR 26 1956
BRISTOL AIRCRAFT
(WESTERN) LIMITED
ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/67
8 Feb 56.

SPECIAL INSPECTION
LOCKING OF LANDING GEAR CLUTCH CABLE STOP

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/6 dated 12 Feb 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	No returns to AMC required

PURPOSE

1 To ensure a more positive lock on the landing gear clutch cable.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspect the landing gear clutch cable stop to ensure the presence of 3 washers Part AN960-516L ea. 2, Part AN 960-516 ea. 1, and a self locking nut Part AN365-524A installed per Figure 1.

NOTE

In the event the bolt (Part 188956) is not long enough to accommodate the extra washer and new nut that will be required in a few cases, a new bolt is to be demanded.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Refer to AMC Message T1042, dated 26 Jun 52.



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared by:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all a/c
4/58
PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

OIL DILUTION PLACARD REMOVAL

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft fitted with Modification EO 05-45B-6A/62
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required

PURPOSE

1 The placard 26JU/644-180023 outlining the propeller feathering system oil dilution procedure on aircraft embodying modification EO 05-45B-6A/62 is unsuitable.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove placard from instrument panel and discard.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Said placard is also to be removed from modification kit 57/516 prior to embodiment of modification EO 05-45B-6A/62.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CARBURETTOR AIR INTAKE DUCTING FOR LOOSE HARDWARE

(This EO replaces AMC LOG 3321 dated 26 Jan 56)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than nex Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Omnibus STATS 318 on positive cases.

PURPOSE

1 An instance has occurred of anchor nuts and other carburettor air intake ducting attaching hardware coming loose and permitted to remain within the ducts. Since the deck screens on this aircraft had been removed or omitted the foreign objects were drawn into the engine where damage to the blower necessitated an engine change. Since the manifold heat system on this aircraft is felt to adequately maintain mixture temperatures at above freezing levels, removal of screens per EO 05-1-2T is not applicable.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove lower engine cowlings.

(b) Inspect air intake ducting for satisfactory general condition and security of the attaching parts throughout.

(c) Remove carburettor air scoop drain plate and check interior for foreign articles

(d) Check for presence of deck screens Part 6906 and ensure they are installed. Where screens are not installed and are not available urgent demands are to be submitted.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

EXCESSIVE BRAKE FLUID SPILLAGE

(This EO cancels and supersedes EO 05-45B-5/61 dated 12 Aug 55)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Periodic Inspection RDs & Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	When new fluid reservoir caps fitted to aircraft.
RETURNS:	Not required

PURPOSE

1 To obviate excessive brake fluid spillage through the brake reservoir breather hole. Cases have been reported of excessive brake fluid spillage through the breather hole due to the surge of return brake fluid when Modifications EO 05-45B-6A/32 and EO 05-45B-6A/58 are incorporated. Special Inspection EO 05-45B-5/61 has been found inadequate to completely eliminate spillage.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate and remove the filler cap of the hydraulic brake fluid reservoir.

(b) Rework the cap to include a 1/8" diameter vent hole centered diametrically.

(c) Manufacture a vent line from 1/8" ID copper tubing; refer Figure 1, flare tube and solder to reservoir cap.

(d) Plug previously used vent hole in reservoir neck.

(e) Fill reservoir to within 1 1/2" to 2" of reservoir top.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 A few aircraft were manufactured with a dome type fluid reservoir; to date there have been no reports of fluid spillage from this type. Since this re-work is impossible to carry out on the type of cap installed on the dome type reservoir, the above detailed inspection and rework will apply only to aircraft fitted with the "tin can" type.

E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all a/c
PROJECT ENGINEER







Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

EO 05-45B-5/63

35-26JU

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

From: CANAIRMAT

TO: MATLIST JIG CANFLAGLANT CANAS 101 COMMFLT DARTMOUTH CANAVHED

Information: CANCOND CANFLAGPAC CEPE DET VALCARTIER OVERSEAS ADDRESSEES

Orig. No. [illegible] | Date 30 NOV

SPECIAL INSPECTION EXPEDITOR AIRCRAFT

A NOT LATER THAN NEXT PRIMARY INSPECTION

B ALL EXPEDITOR 3N 3EM 3T AND 3TM AIRCRAFT EO 05-45B-5/63

C OPERATORS R DEPOTS CONTRACTORS

D RECENT AIRCRAFT INCIDENT REVEALED CRANKCASE BREATHER VENT LINES PROTUDING MUCH FURTHER THAN DIRECTED IN EO 05-45B-6A/1 CAUSING VENT LINE FREEZING CMM OIL PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE FALL OFF AND NECESSITATING ENGINE SHUT DOWN

E INSPECT LEFT AND RIGHT ENGINE CRANKCASE VENT LINE INSTALLATIONS ENSURING LINES PROTUDE NO FURTHER THAN THREE EIGHTS TO ONE HALF INCH BEYOND WRAPPER SHEET GROMMET AS DETAILED EO 04-45B-6A/1

F FIVE MAN MINUTES

G IMMEDIATE LOCAL AMENDMENT EO 05-45B-7A SECTION 2 TO INCLUDE INSPECTION CRANKCASE VENT LINES FOR CORRECT PROTRUSION EVERY 2 CHECK

H NA

J NONE REQUIRED

K FIRST ISSUE

RECEIVED

AUTH .....

EO.05-45B-5/63

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE.

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CRANKCASE BREATHER LINE PROTRUSION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than next prima inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	114, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	N.A.
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE:

1. Recent aircraft incident revealed crankcase breather vent line freezing. Oil pressure and temperature fall off and necessitate engine shut down.

INSPECTION DATA:

2. Inspect left and right crankcase vent line installation ensuring lines protrude no further than 3/8 to ½ inch beyond wrapper sheet grommet as detailed in EO.05-45B-6A

APPLIES TO ALL AIRCRAFT

ISSUE ON AUTHORITY RCAF MESSAGE LOG 334 OF NOVEMBER 30, 1955.

EO.05-45B-5/63

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE.

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CRANKCASE BREATHER LINE PROTRUSION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than next primary inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	114, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	N.A.
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE:

1. Recent aircraft incident revealed crankcase breather vent line freezing. Oil pressure and temperature fall off and necessitate engine shut down.

INSPECTION DATA:

2. Inspect left and right crankcase vent line installation ensuring lines protrude no further than 3/8 to ½ inch beyond wrapper sheet grommet as detailed in EO.05-45B-6A/1

ALL AIRCRAFT

ISSUE ON AUTHORITY RCAF MESSAGE LOG 334 OF NOVEMBER 30, 1955.

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CRANKCASE BREATHER VENT LINES FOR PROTUSION

(This EO replaces AMC Message Log 3334 dated 30 Nov 55)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Not later than next Primary Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not Required

PURPOSE

1 A recent aircraft incident revealed that crankcase breather vent lines protrude much further than directed in EO 05-45B-6A/1 causing vent line freezing, oil pressure and oil temperature falling-off and necessitating engine shutdown.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Inspect left and right engine crankcase vent line installations ensuring lines protrude no further than three eighths to one half inch beyond the wrapper sheet grommet as detailed in EO 05-45B-6A/1.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The Expeditor Maintenance Schedule, EO 05-45B-7A, Section 2, is to be locally amended to include inspection of crankcase vent lines for correct protrusion every #2 check.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ APPLICABLE TO all a/c

PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ENGINE INNER COWL CRACKING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs or Contractor
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Check
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Set
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Spare power plant build-ups are to be inspected.
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To detect cracking of the engine inner cowl, and where cracks found, to inspect periodically until repair or replacement can be made.

MODIFICATION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove engine cowlings and locate Part 84-185910-1 and -2 inner cowling assemblies. Refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 37, index 15.

(b) Inspect the cowl assemblies for cracks particularly around the nine mounting holes through which the engine bearer bolts pass.

(c) Stop-drill all cracks found and make an entry in the Minor Unserviceability section of the L14 to the effect that cracks are present and are to be checked on each Periodic Inspection until next engine change. At this time the defective cowling shall be removed, and repaired or replaced.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACR

E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

EXCESSIVE BRAKE FLUID SPILLAGE

Replaced by 45B-5/64

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Periodic Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1 and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	When new fluid reservoir caps fitted to aircraft.
RETURNS:	Not required

No. 1001 TSD R. C. A. F.

PURPOSE

1 To obviate excessive brake fluid spillage through the tank breather hole. Cases have been reported of excessive brake fluid spillage through the reservoir tank breather hole due to the surge of return brake fluid when modification EO 05-45B-6A/32 and EO 05-45B-6A/58 are incorporated.

RECORDED

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate and remove the filler cap of the hydraulic brake fluid reservoir.

(b) Rework the cap to include a 1/8" dia. vent hole centered diametrically.

(c) Manufacture a splash guard from light alloy steel plate; refer Figure 1.

(d) Bend lugs to allow clearance between the splash guard and cap; solder lugs to inside of cap, see Figure 2.

(e) Plug previous vent hole in reservoir neck.

(f) Fill reservoir to within 1 1/2" to 2" of reservoir top.

NOTE

To fill beyond prescribed limits will result in blow-by through the vent despite the splash guard installation.

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

H. Christiansen
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1



Figure 2

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

WING FLAP SHAFT TAPER PIN HOLES FOR ELONGATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T, and 3TM Aircraft.
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - next Periodic Inspection RDs and Contractors - before issue.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1 and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Cases requiring parts replacement by STATS 325

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the Part 404-187825, shaft flap gear, for elongation of the taper pin holes and to ensure the flap shaft mechanism generally is functioning in a satisfactory manner:

INFORMATION

2 A case has been reported of the Part 404-187825, shaft flap gear (refer to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 70, Index 7) shearing at the universal taper pin hole. All three taper pin holes were found to be elongated on the failed shaft and subsequent inspection of other aircraft revealed similar conditions to a varying degree. The condition is believed to arise from a combination of contributing factors as follows:-

(a) Incorrect reaming and fitting of the taper pins on installation.

(b) Incorrect adjustment of the limit switches.

(c) High torque induced by starting inertia.

NOTE

The first and/or second factors, which are abnormal, combined with the third inescapable factor will undoubtedly cause taper pin hole elongation and eventually, if undetected, shearing of the shaft.

INSPECTION DATA

3 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Refer to Figures 69 and 70 of EO 05-45B-4 for references mentioned in this instruction.

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(b) Remove the taper pins, Index 17, Figure 70, from the 404-187825 shaft and 187809 universals.

(c) Remove housing attaching screws, Index 12, Figure 70.

(d) Loosen the clamp Part 894-187820, holding the RH outboard gear box.

(e) Carefully shift the shafting assembly outboard sufficiently to enable removal of gear housing assembly.

(f) Remove gear housing assembly.

(g) Disassemble housing; remove and clean shaft Part 404-187825 pin of universals and shaft.

(h) Inspect taper holes for elongation.

(j) If only slight elongation is found re-reaming for the existing pin may suffice to make a snug fit This will depend on what size the hole was originally reamed to and the extent of elongation.

(k) If rectification (j) cannot be carried out replace shaft, and universal(s) if necessary, with serviceable ones.

(l) Re-assemble mechanism installation.

NOTE

Ensure gear box correctly re-lubricated.

(m) Check to ensure travel stops are correctly adjusted in accordance with EO 05-45B-5A/13..

(n) During electrical operation of the flap mechanism check shafting from the motor gear box to the outboard wheel-well gear boxes for whipping. No readily perceptible amount of whipping should be evident if the shafting is correctly installed and no enlargement of the taper pin and bolt shaft coupling holes exists.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/59
13 Jun 55

SPECIAL INSPECTION

OIL SHUT OFF VALVE FOR CORRECT ADJUSTMENT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, and 3TM aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Periodic RDs and Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1 and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Not required

Rescinded

JUL 15 1955

1004 TSD

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure correct positioning of the "ON" and "OFF" positions of the oil shut off valve.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A case has been reported of the oil shut off valve being so adjusted as to move past the fully open position and not reaching the fully closed position when the control is in the extreme positions. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate the oil shut off valve in the left and right wheel wells. Refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 60, index 2.

(b) With the controls in the open position ensure the index on the shaft is in the direction of the flow.

NOTE

The arm assembly cannot be used as a guide to the direction of flow since it is approximately 15 degrees past this direction in the open position.

WARNING

Ensure the controls are left in the fully down "OPEN" position and safety wired at the conclusion of this inspection.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. IS ~~NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all referenced A/C
W. Kristiansen
PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

VHF-ILS INTERFERENCE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft fitted with AF/ICA-67
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractor
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as convenient, but not later than the next Inspection.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Letter report to AMC (S TelO/Tel A) on each aircraft where interference is not rectified by this inspection.

PURPOSE

1 To prevent VHF channel "F" interference on channel "Y" ILS.

INSPECTION

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:-

(a) Interference of VHF channel "F" on ILS channel "Y" has been such as to give false on course readings of the ILS indicator. 6RD Project W119/51 revealed that the warning flag was sometimes operated to indicate to the pilot that something was wrong and that "Y" channel was not to be relied upon. This occurred when channel "F" of the VHF was selected, either receiving or transmitting.

(b) The following points are to be checked:-

(1) ILS antenna leads for open circuits or partial grounds.

(2) VHF antenna leads for partial grounds.

(3) Bonding on ICA-67 plugs and mounting. Be sure bonds are in good condition and ground to aircraft frame with shortest practical lengths.

(4) Bonding on localized and glide path receivers.

(5) Correct all faults or unsatisfactory conditions located.

(c) Aircraft that showed interference before this inspection should be flown to determine whether interference has been eliminated. Where interference still exists, a detailed report should be submitted to AMC (S TelO/TelA). Such cases shall be further studied by 6RD as the original project was conducted on only two aircraft.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/S Tel O/Tel A

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE EO 05-45B-5/57
8 Dec 54

SPECIAL INSPECTION

SAFETY WIRING OF WHEEL BEARING CAP NUTS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next #2 Check RDs and Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14-1B and L14-5
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Yes
RETURNS:	None required

Rescinded

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the wheel bearing cap nuts are drilled for safety wire and that safetying o the nuts, when installed, has not been overlooked.

INSPECTION DATA

2 A case has been reported of a unit receiving the subject nuts Part 404-188402-10 nuts outboard, and Part 404-188402-8 nuts inboard, with no holes provided for safety wiring. The omission is an oversight by the contractor and necessitates this inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Locate the wheel bearing cap nuts on the right and left hand main landing gear assemblies refer to EO 05-45B-4 dated 15 Jun 54, Figure 24, index 16.

(b) Ensure the nuts have been drilled for safetying and safety wiring has been carried out

(c) Ensure all spare nuts held in stock are drilled for safety wiring.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
ALL A/C
H. Friedlausen
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CONTROL LOCK FLOORBOARD BRACKET ATTACHMENT SCREW

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Minor Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Books
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the correct screw is installed fixing the control lock floorboard bracket to the floor.

RESCINDED

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Locate the subject AN526-1032-18 screw by reference to EO 05-45B-4, Figure 129, Index 45.

(b) Remove screw and visually check to ensure it is AN526-1032-18 and not AN526-832-18.

(c) Re-install bracket using correct screw, nut and washer as outlined in EO 05-45B-4, Figure 129.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

A. Friedlander
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AAC/SACC/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LANDING GEAR DRAG LEG HOUSING FOR CRACKS

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/55 dated 27 Jul 54)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Minor Inspection, RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 and Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Spare drag legs to be inspected prior to fitment on aircraft
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported by TFR Stats 325

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the hydraulic drag leg housing for cracks using the dye penetrant inspection method.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Place the aircraft on jacks.

(b) Locate and drop from forward attaching point, the landing gear drag leg Part 404-188027.

(c) Using the dye penetrant method of inspection, inspect the drag leg housing, Part 694-188006-1, for cracks.

(d) Repeat on opposite landing gear.

(e) Re-attach struts and lower aircraft off the jacks.

(f) Where cracks or evidence of cracks are found, the drag strut is to be RER'd and replaced with a serviceable one.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Dye-check kits are available under RCAF reference 33C/749.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ APPLICABLE TO
ALL A/C
A. Christiansen
PROJECT ENGINEER

SPECIAL INSPECTION

JAMMING OF CARBURETTOR AIR SCOOP

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/54 dated 18 Jun 54)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Minor Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Spare scoop assemblies to be inspected during fitment to aircraft
RETURNS:	None required by AMC

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the screws securing the sides of the air scoop to the center support are not loosening and falling into the body of the scoop assembly thereby jamming the air shutter valve.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove the hot air inlet ducts from the carburettor air scoop assembly.

(b) Locate upper attaching screw securing the sides of the air scoop to the center support, see Figure 1.

(c) Remove the AN500A-10-10 screw and replace with an AN500-10-18, RCAF Ref. 28/9689, drilled at the end for safety wire or a split pin. Use existing lockwasher.

(d) Wirelock projecting end of screw to the next screw further around the center support, or use a split pin bent in such a manner as to prevent backing off of the screw.

(e) Replace ducting.

(f) Repeat on opposite engine.





Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

SPECIAL INSPECTION
CONDITION & OPERATION
OF LANDING GEAR RETRACT SYSTEM

(This EO replaces AMC Message T4632 dated 7 May 54)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported by omnibus UCR

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the landing gear retract system mechanism for condition and proper function.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Two recent cases of retract chain failure have lead to accidents involving considerable damage during landing and subsequent undercarriage collapse

(a) The chain retract mechanism is to be inspected as follows:-

(1) Main landing gear retract chains for fouling lower sprocket mounting bracket.

(2) Safety clips of chain repair links for distortion and proper installation.

(3) Carry out landing gear retraction test and ensure left main, right main and tail slides are synchronized to reach the upper and lower limits simultaneously.

(b) If the retract chain is fouling it is due to the lower sprocket not correctly centered in the bracket. The manufacturer has not provided positive locking of the sprocket in a central position and sprockets may move off-center particularly if the holes for chain attachments are drilled other than at right angles to the longitudinal axis of the eyebolt. Where fouling is found the eyebolts Parts 404-188540 and 804-188540, are to be inspected for misalignment of holes and slots and the following corrective action taken:-

(1) Place the aircraft on jacks and install a locally manufactured washer between the end of the cross-shaft outboard universal Part 188505, and the shoulder of the lower sprocket Part 804-188563, as required to properly position the lower sprocket. If the sprocket is forced too far outboard by the torque shafts, the splined end of the universal may be filed to provide proper clearance.

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ALL A/C

(2) The outboard bearing is adjusted by pressing it into its support bracket far enough to provide proper clearance for positioning the sprocket and installing a locally manufactured washer of the required thickness against the bearing, refer Figure 1, and center-punch the bearing support casting to retain the washer.

(3) Eyebolts that are found seriously "out-of-true" are to be replaced.

(4) The upper sprocket is to be checked for centering in the mounting bracket a[illegible]n-sure that the sprocket does not turn ON the bolt instead of turning WITH it. If required th[illegible]r-ings are to be correctly positioned and locked as detailed above for the lower sprocket.

(5) Following the above rework a retraction test is to be made to ensure a correction of the fouling, check landing gear synchronization and confirm the setting of the limit switches has not been disturbed.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Since issuing Special Inspection EO 05-45B-5/52 by AMC message T4632 dated 7 May 54, additional information has been received that warrants carrying out a more detailed inspection while simultaneously clarifying the aforementioned SI. To facilitate control and log book action this new SI has been issued rather than amend EO 05-45B-5/52 which will be rescinded.

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THIS E.O. IS / IS NOT APPLICABLE TO

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR



PLAN VIEW LH UNDERCARRIAGE SPROCKET RH OPPOSITE

UNDERCARRIAGE CHAIN DRIVE SPROCKET ASSEMBLY EXPEDITOR 3

Figure 1

(2) The outboard bearing is adjusted by pressing it into its support bracket far enough to provide proper clearance for positioning the sprocket and installing a locally manufactured washer of the required thickness against the bearing, refer Figure 1, and center-punch the bearing support casting to retain the washer.

(3) Eyebolts that are found seriously "out-of-true" are to be replaced.

(4) The upper sprocket is to be checked for centering in the mounting bracket and to ensure that the sprocket does not turn ON the bolt instead of turning WITH it. If required the bearings are to be correctly positioned and locked as detailed above for the lower sprocket.

(5) Following the above rework a retraction test is to be made to ensure a correction of the fouling, check landing gear synchronization and confirm the setting of the limit switches has not been disturbed.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Since issuing Special Inspection EO 05-45B-5/52 by AMC message T4632 dated 7 May 54, additional information has been received that warrants carrying out a more detailed inspection while simultaneously clarifying the aforementioned SI. To facilitate control and log book action this new SI has been issued rather than amend EO 05-45B-5/52 which will be rescinded.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

ISSUED

THIS E.O. IS / IS NOT APPLICABLE TO

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

1 Jun 54

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CONDITION OF LANDING GEAR RETRACT CHAINS

Replaced by 45B/5/53

(This EO replaces AMC Message T4632 dated 7 May 54)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Daily Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 and Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMC

PURPOSE

1 To inspect landing gear retract chains for condition.

RESCINDED

ACTM .....

INSPECTION DATA

2 The recent collapse of two undercarriages on landing have been attributed to retract chain failure. The chain retract mechanism is to be inspected as follows:

(a) Main landing gear retract chains for fouling the lower sprocket mounting bracket.

(b) Spring clips of repair links for distortion and proper seating.

(c) Carry out landing gear retraction test and ensure left main, right main and tail slides are synchronized to reach the upper and lower limits simultaneously.

NOTE

If the chain is fouling it is probably due to the lower sprocket not being centered in its bracket. Corrective action will consist of insertion of spacers (stainless steel or SAE 4130 tubing) inserted in the outboard end of the bracket to ensure positioning and locking of bearing securely. Position lower chain sprocket centrally by shimming it to be moved outboard, or trimming of undercarriage cross shaft outboard universal, Part 188505, to move sprocket inboard.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 EO 05-45B-7A, Expeditor 3 Maintenance Schedule, is felt adequately to cover inspection of retract chains, however the importance of rigid inspection as called for in the -7A and detailed in EO 05-45B-2 is to be stressed to all maintenance personnel.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO

all a/c

H.K.

PROJECT ENGINEER

Douglas

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE EO 05-45B-5/51
9 Apr 54

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LUBRICATION OF FELT STRIPS IN RUDDER HORN BOXES & ELEVATOR TAIL COWLING

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Minor Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To lubricate and waterproof the felt strips in the tail cowling and rudder horn boxes. This will obviate water saturation of the strips and their subsequent freezing.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove the rudder horn boxes and the outer tail cowling.

(b) Using grease, low and high temperature, Spec. 3-GP-683A, RCAF Ref. 34A/192, apply directly to the felt strips ensuring it is well impregnated.

(c) Replace rudder horn boxes and outer tail cowling.

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RECEIVED

ACTN

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/50
18 Mar 54

SPECIAL INSPECTION

TAIL LIGHT FAIRING DRAIN HOLE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Periodic Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon installation
RETURNS:	None required by AMCHQ

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for a drain hole in the bottom of each fairing curvature of the tail light fairing assembly and incorporate drains where none are found.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Cases have been reported of moisture accumulating in the tail light fairing assembly, Part 404-180990, subsequently shorting out the lamps in their respective sockets. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate the tail light fairing assembly, refer to EO 05-45B-4, page 291, Figure 108, item 13.

(b) Inspect for presence of drain hole in bottom of each fairing curvature.

(c) Fairings found without drain holes incorporated are to be reworked to provide a .125" drain at the lowest point in the bottom of each fairing curvature.

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all a/c

K. K.

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

PROPELLER GOVERNOR GASKET

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3T and 3TM aircraft.
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors.
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Periodic Inspection RDs and Contractors - before issue.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMCHQ.

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the presence of a gasket, Part 189021, between the propeller governor and engine mounting pad to prevent oil leakage at this point.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Refer to the Expeditor 3 Part List EO 05-45B-4, Figure 55, Index 30 and 33.

(b) Locate propeller governors on left and right engines and ensure the gasket, Part 189021 is fitted.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

As issued

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

EO 05-45B-5/48
14 Dec 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

INSPECTION OF COCKPIT WINDSCREEN FOR LEAKS

(This EO replaces AMC Message T4563 dated 12 Nov 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	For Units - Next Minor Inspection For RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMCHQ

Preliminary

RESCINDED
AGE

PURPOSE

1 To water test the cockpit windscreen for leaks.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Using a water hose thoroughly water test for leaks the entire cockpit windscreen area. Particular attention is to be paid to the left corner portion where cases have been reported of water running to lower interior corner of the windscreen and thus down the instrument panel to the voltammeter indicator creating a short in the indicator wiring.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 Additional window sealant is to be used to remedy all leaks found.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ / ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO all a/c

K. G.
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

EO 05-45B-5/47
18 Nov 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ANTI-ICER PUMPS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as possible and not later than next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To obviate the possibility of anti-icer fluid entering the electric motor of anti-icer pump Adel Part 20820-1.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Check anti-icer pump for ingress of anti-icer fluid into the electric motor of the pump This condition should not be prevalent in pumps Adel Part 8818-2 but may exist in pumps Ad Part 20820-1. Where this condition exists, remove pumps for overhaul and install new or over hauled pump.

(b) If an Adel pump Part 20820-1 is installed, the lower blanking plug is to be removed drilled with a #40 drill and replaced. This is to allow fluid seepage to drain out or to evaporate

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 For 14 Training Group Units, Canairpeg Message T883 dated 16 Oct 53 refers.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

RECEIVED JAN 18 DEL. R.C.A.F.

COPY

THIS E.O. [redacted] APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

H. Hendriksen
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

Effective all aircraft not delivered to service as of 21 Jan. 53.

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

AIRSPEED INDICATOR RANGE MARKING

(This EO replaces AMC Signal T5340 dated 3 Nov 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as possible, not later than the next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Cancelled

RESCINDED

ACTM .....

PURPOSE

1 To improve the visibility of the airspeed indicator dial graduations.

INSPECTION DATA

2 All airspeed indicator range markings are to be removed with the exception of the red radial mark indicating the upper speed limit. The white index mark is not to be removed. EO 05-45B-1 will be amended accordingly.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO all a/c

K. K.

FLIGHT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

VENTING OF METAL SHIELD ON VOLT-AMMETERS

(This EO replaces AMC Signal T5324 dated 27 Oct 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - On or before next Daily Inspection and before installation RDs and Contractors - Before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	If further failures occur after carrying out this Special Inspection, report to AMC by ..... UCR

PURPOSE

1 To inspect Reference 6A/1217 volt-ammeters for moisture inside the outer metal casing and enlarge the existing drain hole so that moisture will drain off more easily.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Cases have been reported of water collecting inside the outer metal casing of Reference 6A/1217 volt-ammeters installed in Expeditor aircraft causing shorting out of the contacts in the rear of the instrument which in turn will cause the shunt wiring to burn out if the instrument casing is shorted to the frame of the aircraft. This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove the instrument from the aircraft and inspect for signs of moisture inside the outer metal casing.

(b) Enlarge the present drain hole at the bottom rear of the instrument casing using a one eighth inch drill. Ensure that the drain hole is close enough to the rear of the casing to allow moisture to drain off when the instrument is positioned at the angle at which it is mounted in the aircraft, see Figure 1.

(c) This Special Inspection applies only to volt-ammeters with outer metal casings.

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ IS NOT APPLICABLE TO all a/c

K. K.
PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RADIO PANELS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3T Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Cancelled

PURPOSE

1 To permit interchangeability of Beech and MBA radio control panels.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) On receptacle #1 (yellow) on radio control panel MBA 6764.

(1) Wire 1-3-22 Grn is to be removed from pin 3.

(2) Wire 1-2-22 Grn is to be removed from pin 2.

(3) Wire 1-3-22 Grn which was removed from pin 3 is to be soldered to pin 2.

(4) Wire 1-2-22 Grn which was removed from pin 2 is to be soldered to pin 3.

(b) On connector #1 (yellow) of aircraft cable.

(1) Remove wire R801-20 from pin 2.

(2) Remove wire R802-20 from pin 3.

(3) Connect wire R801-20 to pin 3.

(4) Connect wire R802-20 to pin 2.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

APPLIES TO HB 108 AND ALL SUBSEQUENT AIRCRAFT.

Prepared By:
AMC/S Tel O/Tel: PS

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO Expeditor 3 A/C at Plant

Authorized 29-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ENLARGED ELEVATOR TRIM TAB SHAFT TAPER-PIN HOLES

(This EO replaces EO 05-45B-5/44 dated 21 Oct 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3TM and 3T Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the elevator trim tab control torque shaft taper pins for enlarged holes and loose pins. Several cases of loose taper pins, Part 187714-1, installed in the elevator trim tab torque shaft assemblies have been reported. This condition is probably caused by improper fitting of the taper pins permitting a movement of the component parts of the shaft and subsequent enlarging of the holes.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Locate the shaft assembly, elevator tab control, refer EO 05-45B-4, Figure 12, Indices 9 to 19, through the three aft center stabilizer inspection doors.

(b) Locate the six taper pins of the shaft assembly, using flashlight and mirror as necessary for center pins.

(c) Check the taper pins visually and by feel to determine if the pins are loose in the holes.

(d) Where loose pins are found and the holes are enlarged to such an extent that tightening the nut will not correct the condition, or where it is apparent that the pin is pulling through, the following rework is to be carried out at the C Tech O's discretion but not later than the next major inspection:-

(1) Rotate the tab control torque shaft until the nut on the taper pin to be removed is pointing forward and the position of the taper pin is parallel to the upper stabilizer skin.

(2) With the aid of a 1/4 inch drive ratchet, a short extension and 1/4 inch socket remove the AN365-440 nut from the taper pin.

(3) Rotate the torque shaft one half turn and remove the pin.

(4) Select a small taper reamer of appropriate size with a taper of 1/4 inch per foot. If no special ratchet for the reamer is available a 5/16 inch socket and 1/4 inch drive ratchet may be used in conjunction with an AN526-632 nut pressed on the drive end of the reamer.

(5) Using the reamer with ratchet, ream the old holes to take an AN385-20-6 taper pin. Extreme caution must be taken to prevent over reaming.

(6) Thread a sufficient portion of the AN385-20-6 taper pin to take the AN365-440 nut.

(7) Install pin and tighten down with the nut.

(8) Only one taper pin is to be removed and replaced at a time. This will obviate any disturbance of the tab control rigging.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 AN385-20-6 taper pins are to be demanded under Section and Reference 28/11324.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

RADIO PANELS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3T Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Cancelled

PURPOSE

1 To permit interchangeability of Beech and MBA radio control panels.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) On receptacle #1 (yellow) on radio control panel MBA 6764.

(1) Wire 1-3-22 Grn is to be removed from pin 3.

(2) Wire 1-2-22 Grn is to be removed from pin 2.

(3) Wire 1-3-22 Grn which was removed from pin 3 is to be soldered to pin 2.

(4) Wire 1-2-22 Grn which was removed from pin 2 is to be soldered to pin 3.

(b) On connector #1 (yellow) of aircraft cable.

(1) Remove wire R801-20 from pin 2.

(2) Remove wire R802-20 from pin 3.

(3) Connect wire R801-20 to pin 3.

(4) Connect wire R802-20 to pin 2.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

APPLIES TO HB 108 AND ALL SUBSEQUENT AIRCRAFT.

Prepared By:
AMC/STelO/Tel.PS

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3 A/C
in Plant
[signature] 29-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

EO 05-45B-5/42
9 Sep 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

REVERSE CURRENT RELAYS 5U/1778

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Not later than next Minor Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before issue of aircraft
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Yes
RETURNS:	By signal to AMC stating quantity of G. E. Relays

Rescinded

RESCINDED
AUTH .....

PURPOSE

1 General Electric Reverse - Current Relays Models 3GTR76AI and 3GTR76AIA have been found to be unsatisfactory for further use in the RCAF due to internal circuit arrangement that renders the use of them a maintenance hazard.

INSPECTION DATA

2 If General Electric Models 3GTR76AI or 3GTR76AIA Reverse Current Relays (5U/1778) are found installed, they are to be replaced with 5U/1778 Relays manufactured by either Hartman or Westinghouse.

CAUTION

Disconnect batteries and ensure that no external power supply is connected to the aircraft before attempting replacement action.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 All General Electric Models 3GTR76AI or 3GTR76AIA Reverse Current Relays found installed or in stock are to be disposed of in accordance with CAP 16, Vol. 1, Chapter 13.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3A/C in Plant
[signature] 29-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

IDENTIFICATION OF CABLES

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3TM and 3T
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 To positively identify cables leading to the R89B/ARN-5 receiver, due to possibility of interchanging one cable with a cable used on the servo amplifier.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of inspection:-

RESCINDED

(a) Type on white bond paper - "R89B/ARN-5".

(b) Cut out two copies of this designation and attach one to each of the cables used with the R89B/ARN-5 receiver. The identification shall be placed on the cable with scotch tape near the connector.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

NOTE: Applies to all aircraft not accepted by R.C.A.F.

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
Expediter 3 A/C
in Plant
H Lauch 29-9-53
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/STel O/Tel. PS

EO 05-45B-5/40
23 Jul 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LOOP DEHYDRATOR

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Rescinded

RESCINDED
AUTH.....

PURPOSE

1 To ensure correct operation of loop dehydrating equipment.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove dehydrator hose from dehydrator and loop base.

(b) Check for unremoved seals on above items and remove if found present.

(c) Check hose for blockages or leaks and replace if necessary.

(d) Re-install hose and fasten securely.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ IS APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3 a/c in plant
H.L.
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/S Tel O/Tel.

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
INSPECTION OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER RIBS FOR BUCKLING

(This EO cancels AMC Message T4576 dated 25 Jun 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Daily Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported by Omnibus UCR

RESCINDED
AGTM .....

PURPOSE

1 To inspect ribs of horizontal stabilizers for cracked or buckled ribs.

INFORMATION

2 Cases have been reported of horizontal stabilizer ribs buckling and cracking, probably caused by personnel placing back and shoulders under the stabilizer to assist tail wheel castoring. Several of the reported cases are serious enough to warrant placing the aircraft unserviceable.

INSPECTION DATA

3 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Inspect the stabilizer lower skin for signs of "dishing" of the skin between ribs which would indicate extreme pressures had been exerted.

(b) Exert hand pressure on the outer skin over the ribs watching for "giving" indicating rib buckling.

(c) Inspect the ribs through inspection holes, using a light and mirror as required, for buckling and cracks between the lightening holes.

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
all a/c
K. K.
PROJECT ENGINEER

INSPECTION DATA (Cont'd)

(d) Positive cases are to be assessed by the CTechO and where immediate repair is necessary, the stabilizer is to be removed and replaced. Where the buckling is only of minor nature, the details are to be reported by UCR and the condition entered in minor unserviceability section of the L14. A field repair scheme for minor cases will be issued if the results of this inspection indicate such is warranted.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

4 Ground handling personnel are to be warned of the seriousness of this malpractice through the medium of flight and section orders.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF CARBURETTOR AIR DUCT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Minor Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

Rescinded

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the carburettor air scoops for chafing where they pass through the lower engi cowling stiffener, Part 404-185986, cut-outs.

RESCINDED
ACTM.....

INSPECTION DATA

2 This Inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove the 18S585OP-16, -17, -18 and -19 wrapper cowlings.

(b) Inspect the carburettor air intake ducts where they pass through the lower ring cowli stiffener cut-outs for sufficient clearance to avoid chafing or cutting of the duct.

(c) Where insufficient clearance is found, the cut-out is to be enlarged to provide the necessa clearance but not to exceed the maximum dimensions outlined in Figure 1.

~~Applies to all aircraft not accepted by R.C.A.F.~~

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ APPLIES TO
ALL A/C
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1 Expeditor Air[illegible]nafing of Carburettor Air Duct

RESCINDED
ACTN

Prepared By: ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
BINDING OF TAIL SHOCK STRUT

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Minor Inspection Contractors and RDs - before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive Cases by TFR

PURPOSE

1 To inspect the 404-188612, ABSORBER ASSEMBLY - tail wheel shock for binding, part cularly in the fully compressed position.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Two recent accidents have occurred where Expeditor 3 tail wheels have failed to lower only partially lowered and collapsed on landing. These failures have been attributed to bindi of the tail shock strut in the fully compressed position and subsequent shearing of the slide she bolt when the top of the cylinder contacts the slide tube early in the retraction cycle. This i spection is to be carried out as follows:

RESCINDED

(a) Release air from tail shock strut.

(b) Remove weight of aircraft from tail wheel assembly. AUTH.....

(c) With filler plug removed, compress and extend the strut over its entire travel by han

(d) If binding is present at any point of travel, a new strut is to be installed.

NOTE

Tightness of packing glands will restrict ease of movement. Ensure where binding is suspected, it is not due to excessive tension of packing nut.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 The importance of proper tail strut inflation is stressed. Immediately preceding one of t above mentioned accidents, the pilot had reported an over-extended tail strut. A member of t ground crew had released a portion of the air, and it is possible too much was released resulti in collapse during taxiing jamming the piston into the bottom of the cylinder.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR

~~Applies to all aircraft not accepted by R.C.A.F.~~

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
INSPECTION OF FUEL LINES FOR CHAFING AND LEAKS

(This EO replaces AMC Message T4629 dated 15 May 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3 Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units, RDs, and Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units - Next D.I.
RDs and Contractors - on issue

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14, Log Book

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: NA

RETURNS: Commands and AMC Units to submit returns by message

Rescinded

RESCINDED

AGTH

PURPOSE

1 To inspect fuel lines of center section for chafing and leaks.

INFORMATION

2 A recent case has been reported of the fuel line, immediately under the battery tray, nea the lower skin, chafing on a longitudinal stringer causing fuel leakage.

INSPECTION DATA

3 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove the necessary panels to make the center section fuel lines as accessible as po sible.

(b) Remove the batteries.

(c) Using a flashlight and mirror where necessary inspect the center section fuel lines chafing and leaks. To inspect directly below the battery tray it may be necessary to trace lines by feel to detect chafing.

(d) Where chafing is evident or imminent, lines are to be re-routed to clear or a rubber bu per incorporated. Where leaking is found lines are to be removed and repaired or replac

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THIS E.O. IS [redacted] APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SAGO/ACR

EO 05-45B-5/34
10 Jun 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
CHAFING OF WIRING BUNDLE ON OIL AND FUEL PRESSURE LINES

Replaced by 45B-LB/1

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3N, 3NM and 3TM Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Operating Units, RDs and Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Units - Before next flight
RDs and Contractors - Before issue of Aircraft

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14, Log Book

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: NA

RETURNS: Positive cases to be reported by UCR if not previously reported

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for chafed wiring caused by wire bundle rubbing on oil and fuel pressure lines.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The wiring bundle is to be inspected for chafing where it passes the bend in the starboard piping, #1, 2 and 3, reference EO 05-45B-4, Page 149, Figure 61.

3 If wiring if found to be chafed, additional plastic wrapping or sponge rubber padding may be applied in affected area pending modification

ADDITIONAL DATA

4 This Special Inspection cancels AMC Signal T5497 dated 4 May 53.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Applies to "B" crash only.

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ IS APPLICABLE TO ALL REFERENCE AIRCRAFT

PROJECT ENGINEER

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF GENERATOR AND IGNITION CONDUIT IN BATTERY COMPARTMENT

(This EO replaces AMC Signal T5496, dated 4 May 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PREFORMED:	Operating Units - Next Daily Inspection RDs, Contractors - before issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Nil

Retained
RECEIVED
AUTH

PURPOSE

1 Cases have been reported where the ignition and generator cables were found badly chafed by rubbing on skin stringers in bottom of battery compartment.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Check throughout the entire length of the ignition and generator conduits for chafing.

(b) Ensure all conduits are supported by clamps to avoid chafing.

(c) Replace chafed conduits, if necessary.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Applies to all aircraft not accepted by R.C.A.F.

Prepared By: IS
AMC/SACO/ACA

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO

EO 05-45B-5/32
15 May 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
MASTER BATTERY SWITCH
WARNING PLACARD

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3TM and 3T Aircraft.
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Daily Inspection RDs and Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

RECEIVED
AGTH .....

PURPOSE

1 To placard the master battery switches ensuring they are not turned "ON" when the external power source is connected. This will obviate boiling of the batteries and subsequent burning-out of battery relays.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Type following warning on white bond paper:

WARNING

Do NOT turn battery master switch "ON" while external power source is connected.

(b) Cut out and affix with scotch tape to instrument sub-panel above the battery master switch, between the master switch throw bar and the circuit breakers.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

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applies to all ac not accepted by RCAF
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACR

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

STRINGERS - FUEL TANK RECESS - FRACTURE

Cancelled

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as possible but not later than the next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Positive returns by TFR to AMC

RECORDED
ACFI .....

PURPOSE

1 To prevent damage to the mainplane skin in the area of the fuel tanks.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Fracture has occurred of the stringer to which the fuel tank door is attached. This is du to lack of Radii of the cut out which allows clearance for the fuel tank sump.

(a) Where fracture is found the stringer is to be repaired by reinforcing the damaged membe with an extruded or hand formed splice in accordance with Figure 1 or Figure 2,

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ALL A/C
PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1 Stringer Repair with Formed Angle



Figure 2 Stringer Repair with Extruded Angle

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

EO 05-45B-5/29
4 May 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

COPY

INSPECTION OF OIL TANKS FOR CORROSION

(This Special Inspection cancels AMC Message T4591 dated 31 Mar 53)

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Repair Depots and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next oil change
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 and Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Cases necessitating tank replacement by UCR

Rescinded

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect interior of Expeditor 3 oil tanks (Parts 644-189801 and 644-189801-1) for corrosion and take preventative action.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Corrosion has been found to exist in the bottom skin of some Expeditor 3 oil tanks. This corrosion is caused by electrolytic action which is set up when the brass chain, attaching the keeper to the dipstick, comes in contact with the aluminum tank when the cap is secured. This inspection and corrective action is to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Flush oil tank and inspect as closely as possible the interior of the tank for corrosion where keeper and brass chain would rest. Advanced corrosion is indicated by deep pits of a small diameter - 1/16 to 3/32 of an inch.

(b) Ensure chain holding the keeper to the dipstick is not longer than three links.

(c) In view of the impossibility of accurately assessing the extent of corrosion when viewed through the filler neck it is also impossible to lay down tolerances governing the amount permissible before replacement becomes necessary. It will therefore be left to the discretion of the C TECH O to assess positive cases and determine if replacement of the oil tank is warranted.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Applicable A/c except not yet accepted

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE T
ALL A/C
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ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

COPY

SPECIAL INSPECTION
CABLE IDENTIFICATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor aircraft 3N, 3NM, 3TM, 3
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RD's, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil Required

PURPOSE

1 To identify cable connectors of the isolation amplifier.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection data is as follows:

(a) Type on white bond paper "STATION A".

(b) Cut out this statement.

(c) Identify cable leading to station A connector on isolation amplifier.

(d) Using scotch tape attach above slip of paper on cable adjacent to connector identified (c), ensuring the statement is visible under normal servicing conditions.

RESCINDED

AUTH .....

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

EFFECTIVE ALL AIRCRAFT NOT ACCEPTED BY RCAF.

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3 A/C
in Plant
Mohawk 27-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/STe10/Tel

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

LAMP ASSEMBLY - COCKPIT EXTENSION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L 14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	NA

PURPOSE

1 A survey of unit aircraft revealed a number of plastic shields on the cockpit extension light were burned due to overheating, caused by the light being left on for long periods. This constituted a fire hazard.

INSPECTION DATA

2 At next aircraft inspection remove plastic shield from lamp housing. Reference EO 05-45B-4 Figure 3 item 19 page 298 Part 804-180866.

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Effective all aircraft.

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ALL A/C
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Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACA 2

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

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SPECIAL INSPECTION
MAGNETO FIREWALL
CABLE HARNESS INSTALLATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3T Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Before Next Flight
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	114 Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil
RETURNS:	Nil

Rescinded

RECORDED

PURPOSE

1 To rectify incorrect ignition harness connections at socket connector as these connectio were found to be reversed.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection data is as follows:

(a) Pin "A" on socket connector AN3108-20-26S should be connected to right outboard magnet

(b) Pin "B" should be connected to ignition switch terminal of induction vibrator feeding l inboard magneto.

(c) Check can be made by testing for continuity of Pin "A" induction vibrator terminal cable harness.

(d) If connections at socket connector are found to be reversed, action is to be taken to co rect connections to socket connector.

3 This special inspection cancels AMCHQ signal T5436 18 Mar 53.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

EFFECTIVE ALL AIRCRAFT NOT IN SERVICE HANGAR.

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3T A/C
in Plant

29-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/ACA2-2

Original

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

INSPECTION OF -12 TUBE OF CENTRE SECTION TRUSS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expediter 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Repair Depots and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	NA

Original

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect -12 tube, centre section truss, for abrasion from landing gear universal boo and install a clamp in area of abrasion, if necessary.

INSPECTION DATA

2 On Expediter 3s with rubber dust boot covers on the outboard landing gear torque shaf universal, evidence of chafing has been found in the lower landing gear slide tube cluster, where the shaft universal rubber boot cover has been rubbing the -12 tube. With the possibility of oi or grease and dust in this area, the rubber boot may act as an abrasive wheel and tend to cu into the -12 tube.

(a) All Expediter 3 aircraft are to be inspected for this condition in both right and left hand nacelles. If evidence of chafing is found, install a clamp over the affected area, as shown in Figure 1.

NOTE: Inspect these clamps every minor inspection for wear and replace, if necessary.

EFFECTIVE ALL AIRCRAFT

Effective all aircraft

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PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

Eng.

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/24
10 Mar 53

COPY

SPECIAL INSPECTION

BURNING OF RUDDER CABLES

AT UNDERCARRIAGE MOTOR

Replaced by 45B-6B/

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs, Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Minor Inspection RDs, Contractors - Before Issue
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	Nil

RECORDED

AUTH.....

PURPOSE

1 To eliminate the burning of the port rudder cable caused by contact with the undercarria motor.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Inspection to be carried out as follows:-

(a) Remove belly access door.

(b) In conjunction with an AF Technician examine rudder cables according to EO 05-1-2

(c) Examine terminals of undercarriage motor for insulating nipples. If they are not i sulated, disconnect them from undercarriage motor and install the insulating nipples over t terminals using AN 781-3, RCAF Ref. 5K/408.

(d) Reconnect to motor and replace belly access door.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3 A/C in Plant
[signature] 29-9-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

EMBODIED IN EO 05-45B-6B/1

Prepared By:
AMC/ACA2

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

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SPECIAL INSPECTION

ANTENNA RELAY BRACKET

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: Expeditor Aircraft 3N, 3NM, 3T, 3TM

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Units, RDs and Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Next Inspection

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14

MODIFICATION OF SPARES IN STOCK: Nil Required

PURPOSE

1 To increase ease of removing or replacing screw holding interphone amplifier in position.

MODIFICATION DATA

2 The following is the sequence of operations:

(a) Refer to Figure 1.

(b) Locate centre of hole 5/8 in. from bottom of bracket and 1-1/8 in. from the lef[illegible] o[illegible] the Antenna Relay Bracket.

(c) Drill a 3/8 in. hole in bracket at point located in para (b).

(d) Remove rough edges from metal.

PARTS REQUIRED

3 Nil.

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/c

PROJECT ENGINEER



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/STelO/TelPS

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

Revised

COPY

SPECIAL INSPECTION

GYROSYN COMPASS WIRING

Replaced by 45B-5A/

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3 TM
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RD's and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Minor Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	Aircraft Log Book, L14
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	NA
RETURNS:	None required by AMCHQ

RECORDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the Gyrosyn Compass System is correctly wired when Ref. 6A/1261, Indicator, Master, Mk 4B is not installed.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out in the following manner:-

(a) Check for continuity between pin number "2" of the C2 master indicator connector and pin "M" of the C2 amplifier.

(b) If continuity exists in the above circuit, the aircraft is correctly wired for the model TM role.

(c) If this circuit is not continuous, remove wire number 1020-18 from terminal number and reconnect it to terminal number 13 in the navigation instrument junction box located under the upholstery, aft of the co-pilot's seat.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 On installation of Ref. 6A/1261 indicator master Mk 4B, in the system, such as on conversion of the role of the aircraft from model TM to model N or NM, wire number 1020-18 is to be removed from terminal number 13 and re-connected to terminal number 3 at the junction box in accordance with EO 05-45B-2, Part 10, Page 184.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By
AMC/SACO/ACA1

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PROJECT ENGINEER

3

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

ELECTRICAL CABLE - EDISON FIRE DETECTOR

Revised

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft.
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units, RDs and Contractors.
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Units - Next Daily Inspection RDs, Contractors - Before Issue.
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book.
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	N.A.
RETURNS:	Nil.

RESCINDED

AUTH.....

PURPOSE

1 Prab to heat warning signal in cockpit indicates serviceable system in port and starboa nacelle. Investigation reveals an unserviceability in the starboard Fire Detection Junction B caused by Wires 147 and 149 being reversed.

INSPECTION DATA

2 To test starboard nacelle installation for reversed wires, carry out a heat test on detecto using a soldering iron. If there is no indication in the cockpit of a serviceable system, rever wires and repeat test.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO
Expeditor 3 A/C
& Fleet
Holland 29-2-55
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/ACA 2-2

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF HOSE CLAMPS ON FUEL TANK COVERS

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil
RETURNS:	Nil

RECOMMENDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure the fuel vent line hose clamps are not positioned to permit chafing on rear fuel tank covers.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove right and left rear fuel tank covers (Part 181164 and 181164-1).

(b) Inspect two clamps, on hose AN884-6-15 connecting tubes 189793 and 404-189797 of fuel tank vent (Ref. EO 95-45B-4, Page 185, Fig. 73, Index 1, 2 and 3) for proper positioning ensuring that no part of the clamp comes in contact with the tank covers.

(c) Corrective action, if necessary, will consist of loosening clamps and repositioning to provide clearance between clamp and cover.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. 15 APPLICABLE TO

ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

EO 05-45B-5/17

✓W E ROBINSON INFO

H McLAUGHLIN INFO

P LATOCKI INFO

R.C.A.F. MESSAGE

RESCINDED

From:	10TSU CALGARY
TO:	TSR 1004 TSD/MBA WINNIPEG
Information:	TSR 1003 TSD/CPA (R) CALGARY
Orig. No. T40E	Date 19 NOV

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMC QUOTE T4597 17 NOV EXPEDITOR 3 SPECIAL INSPECTION 05-45-B-5/17 CHAFING OF DE ICER LINE (.) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND LATER THAN NEAT MINOR INSPECTION INSPECT DE ICER LINE FOR CHAFING AGAINST FLAP TRAVEL LIMIT SWITCH ML ACCESS TO THIS CONDITION THROUGH INSPECTION DOOR ON COCKPIT FLOOR BETWEEN PILOT AND CO PILOT SEATS ML LINE CAN BE SPRUNG ENOUGH TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CLEARANCE ML UNQUOTE (.)

THIS E.O. ~~IS~~ IS NOT APPLICABLE TO

MBA

H. Friedhausen
PROJECT ENGINEER

SS-25JU T O FIL

M

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/17
23 Feb 53

SPECIAL INSPECTION

CHAFING OF DE-ICER LINE AGAINST FLAP TRAVEL LIMIT SWITCH

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Repair Depots
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	None required

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for, and rectify if necessary, chafing of the de-icer line against flap travel limit switch.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove the inspection door on cockpit floor between pilot and co-pilot seats.

(b) Inspect de-icer lines in vicinity of flap travel limit switch for chafing.

(c) in event of positive cases, carefully inspect line for serviceability and replace if necessary. If still serviceable spring sufficiently to provide a safe clearance.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This Special Inspection cancels AMC message T4597, dated 17 Nov 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. IS APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

T. ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

Replaced by

EO 05-45B-5/16
19 Feb 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
CHAFING OF OIL DILUTION FUEL LINE
ON FIRE DETECTION WIRE AND DE-ICER LINE

5/73

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Daily Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage.
RETURNS:	Positive cases to be reported by UCR.

RECORDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for, and rectify if necessary, chafing of oil dilution fuel line on fire detection wire and de-icer line.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This Inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) Several cases have been reported of the oil-dilution fuel line (Part 644-189749) chafing on the fire detection wire and de-icer line. The subject fuel line runs from oil dilution valve down behind and through the firewall.

(b) The entire length of the line is to be inspected and in the event of chafing the fire detection wire and/or de-icer is to be so supported as to eliminate the condition and the fuel line replaced if necessary.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This Special Inspection cancels AMC Message #4572 dated 7 Oct 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

RECEIVED
MAR 15
PRODUCTION PLANNING

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ IS APPLICABLE TO
ALL A/d

PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION FOR LOOSE MASS BALANCE IN RUDDER HORN

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, RDs and Contractors
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodical Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	On removal of aircraft from storage.
RETURNS:	None required.

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To inspect for loose mass balance in the rudder horn and rectify positive cases.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) While moving the rudder sharply back and forth by hand listen for a thumping noise rudder horn.

(b) If thumping is heard it may be assumed the mass balance weight is loose and the attachi screws are to be re-tightened. Access to the screw heads may be obtained by cutting 1/2" hol on the leading edge of rudder horn around the heads, and access to the nuts by cutting a hole from leading edge on under side of the horn. The holes later to be patched using approved dop fabric patching methods.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 This cancels AMC message T4560 dated 25 Sept 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

D. Sutherland
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION
FLAP GEAR SHAFT INSTALLATION

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors and RDs
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Periodic Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of Aircraft from storage.
RETURNS:	Positive results to AMC by UCR

Rescinded

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure bending, and possible shearing of the flap gear shaft at attachment points to the port and starboard flap drive universals, is not being caused by incorrect installation of the taper pins.

INSPECTION DATA

2 Cases have been reported where the flap gear shaft (Part 404-187825) at the attachment points to the port and starboard flap driveshaft universals (Parts 187809 and 187797) has been bending due to the incorrect installation of taper pins. The holes in the shaft appear to be drilled larger than the holes in the universals permitting movement of the pins. This causes a progressive unsatisfactory condition starting with hole elongation, eventual bending and ultimate shearing of the shaft.

(a) Inspect the subject gear shaft and universal attachment points for correct installation of the taper pins and elongation of the holes.

(b) Check the shaft for evidence of bending.

(c) Incorrect installations are to be removed and a new gear shaft installed. The gear housing then mounted and shaft drilled and reamed to fit the universals which are mounted on the flap operating shaft (Part 187831).

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This special inspection cancels AMC message #T1295 dated 20 Aug 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

THIS E.O. ~~IS NOT~~ IS APPLICABLE TO ALL A/C

PROJECT ENGINEER

EO 05-45B-5/1
16 Feb 53

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTION

FOULING OF AILERON CABLES

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors and Repair Depots
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Next Daily Inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 and Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Nil
RETURNS:	Nil

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To ensure that the aileron cables are not fouling against a small gusset within the main plane.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection is to be carried out as follows:

(a) By visual inspection through the aileron bell crank inspection doors ensure the outboard aileron cables are not fouling against a small gusset located on the top side of the interior wing surface approximately four inches forward of pulleys Parts 187301LH and 187301-1RH.

(b) If cable fouling route the gusset sufficiently to provide cable clearance and carefully inspect the cable for wear beyond the prescribed limits. Replace cable if necessary.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This Special Inspection cancels AMC message T1231 dated 6 Aug 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

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ALL A/C
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE.

EO 05-45B-5/
16 Feb 53

SPECIAL INSPECTION

REMOVAL OF CONTROL LOCK DISC

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	All Expeditor 3 Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors and Repair Depots
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as possible and not later than next periodical inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14, Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Nil

PURPOSE

1 To obviate the possibility of the pilot's heel catching on the disc while the lock is in the stowed position.

INSPECTION DATA

2 The dangle assembly control lock, Part 404-187061, is to be removed from the main body of the lock assembly by removal of the retaining shackle pin and cotter pin. The parts removed are to be disposed of in accordance with CAP 16, Vol 1, Q13.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This Special Inspection cancels AMC message #T1178 dated 23 Jul 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

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PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

RECEIVED JAN 23 DEC

ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

EO 05-45B-5/10
16 Feb 53

SPECIAL INSPECTION

INSPECTION FOR LOOSE DEBRIS IN BOTTOM OF FUSELAGE

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED:	Expeditor 3N, 3NM, 3TM and 3T Aircraft
BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	Operating Units, Contractors and Repair Depots
WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED:	As soon as possible and not later than next periodic inspection
RCAF FORM ENTRIES:	L14 and Log Book
INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK:	Upon removal of Aircraft from storage
RETURNS:	Nil

RESCINDED

PURPOSE

1 To obviate the possibility of the fouling of controls due to the presence of foreign objects, introduced during manufacture, lying loosely along the bottom skin.

INSPECTION DATA

2 This inspection to be carried out as follows:

(a) Remove all the removable panels necessary to expose a maximum amount of the interior bottom fuselage skin.

(b) Using flashlights and mirrors as required, inspect the entire length of the inside bottom fuselage for foreign objects such as screws, bolts, wire etc., and effect the removal of all such objects found.

(c) Particular attention is to be paid to the area under the cockpit and cabin floor.

ADDITIONAL DATA

3 This Special Inspection cancels AMC message #T1098 dated 9 Jul 52.

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

This inspection to be carried out just prior to R.C.A.F. acceptance flight.

THIS E.O. IS ~~IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO all a/c
K.K.
PROJECT ENGINEER

Prepared By:
AMC/SACO/ACR2

COPY

SPECIAL INSPECTION

SHORTING OF ELECTRIC PANEL SWITCHES

Rescinded

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED: All Expeditor 3 Aircraft

BY WHOM WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Units, RDs, Contractors

WHEN WORK WILL BE PERFORMED: Units - Next Minor Inspection
RDs, Contractors - Before Issue

RCAF FORM ENTRIES: L14, Log Book

INSPECTION OF SPARES IN STOCK: N.A.

RETURNS: None required by AMC

RECOMMENDED

PURPOSE:

1 To prevent the screws in the switches from shorting on the switch panel.

INSPECTION DATA:

2 The following is the sequence of operations:-

(a) The switch panels on both the pilots and co-pilots side should be inspected for clearance between the panel and the switch screws. In addition, the switch screws should be checked for tightness (see figure 1).

(b) If the clearance between the switches and the panel is found to be insufficient, the panel should be bent back with a bending tool until at least 1/2 inch clearance is obtained. All switch screws should be tightened.



Figure 1

ISSUED ON AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Prepared By:
AMC/SAESO/E2

THIS E.O. ~~IS IS NOT~~ APPLICABLE TO
All A/c

H. Diethauser
PROJECT ENGINEER